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Abstract We consider extending the modal logic KD45, commonly taken as the base-
line system for belief, with propositional quantifiers that can be used to formalize
natural language sentences such as “everything I believe is true” or “there is some-
thing that I neither believe nor disbelieve.” Our main results are axiomatizations of
the logics with propositional quantifiers of natural classes of complete Boolean alge-
bras with an operator (BAOs) validating KD45. Among them is the class of complete,
atomic, and completely multiplicative BAOs validating KD45. Hence, by duality, we
also cover the usual method of adding propositional quantifiers to normal modal log-
ics by considering their classes of Kripke frames. In addition, we obtain decidability
for all the concrete logics we discuss.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider extending the modal logic KD45, commonly taken as the
baseline system for belief, with propositional quantifiers that can be used to formalize
natural language sentences such as “everything I believe is true” or “there is some-
thing that I neither believe nor disbelieve.” Our main results are axiomatizations of
the logics with propositional quantifiers of natural classes of complete Boolean alge-
bras with an operator (BAOs) validating KD45. Among them is the class of complete,
atomic, and completely multiplicative BAOs validating KD45. Hence, by duality, we
also cover the usual method of adding propositional quantifiers to normal modal log-
ics by considering their classes of Kripke frames. In addition, we obtain decidability
for all the concrete logics we discuss.
Yifeng Ding
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2The present work can be seen as sitting at the intersection of two strands of lit-
erature: the doxastic logic literature, since we are extending KD45, and the literature
on modal logics with propositional quantifiers, since we are extending with proposi-
tional quantifiers. In both bodies of literature, algebraic approaches are not particu-
larly popular. Moreover, KD45 was not discussed in the literature of modal logics with
propositional quantifiers until very recently [7]. To explain our motivation and poten-
tial contribution to the two bodies of literature in more detail, we use two subsections
below.
1.1 Dubious principles and possible-world semantics
Since Hintikka [31], modal logic has been indispensable for the study of intensional
propositional operators like knowledge and belief. For the belief case, the system
KD45 arose naturally as a baseline system. The reason may be that KD45 puts to-
gether the properties that we immediately recognize as what an ideal agent’s belief
(or an agent’s ideal belief) should have: logical omniscience, consistency, and full
introspection. Indeed, the modal rule and axioms in the standard axiomatization of
KD45 can be matched precisely to these properties: the necessitation rule and K to log-
ical omniscience, D to consistency, and 4 and 5 to introspection. The attitudes toward
these idealizations vary (see, for example, more friendly views in [52] and Section
1.3 of [12] and much less friendly views in [47]), but the system KD45 remains central
(for its most recent appearance, see [3] but also [2]).
Coming along with the syntactical formalism of modal logic is the possible-
world semantics based on possible-worlds and accessibility relations (namely Kripke
frames). The use of possible-world semantics is perhaps mainly fueled by the corre-
spondence and completeness results for most philosophically interesting modal for-
mulas. When deciding which axioms to use, if we accept that possible-world seman-
tics in general is appropriate, we may first find out the axioms’ corresponding frame
conditions. To quote David Lewis in [44, p. 19], “instead of asking the baffling ques-
tion whether whatever is actual is necessarily possible, we could try asking: is the
relation R symmetric?” When we already have a strong intuition on which logic is
the most appropriate (for whatever purpose), we may still want to use possible-world
models to succinctly represent a consistent set of formulas describing a situation and
then guide our syntactic reasoning in that situation. Completeness guarantees that this
is always possible.
For the belief case, if we are not venturing below K, the standard possible-world
semantics based on Kripke frames is always appropriate by Sahlqvist’s completeness
theorem [10, § 5.6], since the relevant axioms are D, 4, and 5, which are all Sahlqvist
formulas. Moreover, all modal logics extending KD45 are Kripke-complete in the
sense that they are complete with respect to the classes of Kripke frames on which
they are valid [46]. Even with the addition of dynamic operators as in [50], semantics
based on possible-worlds is still largely appropriate, and many such extensions start
with possible-world semantics. While it is well known that there are Kripke incom-
plete logics [34], meaning that no classes of Kripke frames can validate precisely the
theorems in those logics, perhaps, when studying belief operators, Kripke frames are
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always enough for us, and there is nothing that can “banish” us from, to borrow from
David Lewis again, “a doxastic logician’s paradise”?
As another way of extending the language of Doxastic logic, consider proposi-
tional quantifiers. While we naturally quantify over propositions in both ordinary and
philosophical discourses about belief, the addition of propositional quantifiers is not
given much attention in the literature. Can we repeat the success story of the Kripke
semantics here again, or are we in the situation that, with propositional quantifiers,
we gain enough expressivity so that Kripke frames with their well-documented quirks
in the literature on Kripke incompleteness lead to unwanted validities? Note that if
there are formulas in the extended language such that, on the one hand, they are valid
on Kripke frames validating a logic L, and on the other hand, we have strong reasons
to at least treat them as optional and study and use extensions of L without them,
Kripke frames must go.
Indeed, a number of new principles about belief that seem conceptually signifi-
cant are formalizable in the extended language.
– “One believes that everything one believes is true” is formalized as B∀p(Bp→
p).
– “If no matter what p stands for, one believes that ϕ , then one believes that no
matter what p stands for, ϕ” is formalized as ∀pBϕ → B∀pϕ .
– “There is a proposition that the agent takes to be consistent and to settle every-
thing” can be formalized as ∃q(B̂q∧∀p(B(q→ p)∨B(q→¬p))).
Conceptually, then, we can ask: if we would like to take all the idealizations encoded
in KD45 on board, should we also adopt or are we already committed to some of the
principles above, once we add propositional quantifiers into our language?
Let us focus on the first principle, which we call Immod: “one believes that ev-
erything one believes is true.” Even for idealized agents or idealized beliefs, as ax-
iomatized by KD45, it seems that Immod should not be included in a logic of belief.
After all, the idealizations we are granting here are only about logic and introspec-
tion and do not warrant the truth of the uncertain beliefs that we choose to believe.
Immod should be distinguished from “for every proposition p, one believes that if she
believes that p then p” (with the “if ... then ...” here being the material implication).
This principle, when formalized as ∀p(B(Bp→ p)), is merely the universalization
of a simple consequence of the negative introspection axiom. The crucial difference
between this principle and Immod is that Immod says that one believes the totality of
one’s belief to be true, while ∀pB(Bp→ p) says only that for every proposition p,
when considered individually, one believes that if p is believed, then p is true.
More concretely, we can take an agent who has credences about a real number
x randomly generated (perhaps by an unending sequence of fair coin flips) from the
interval [0,1]. For all measurable X ⊆ [0,1], the agent’s credence that x ∈ X is just
the measure of X . In addition, in this simple example, it seems not against our intu-
itive understanding of the concept of outright belief that the agent can simply believe
precisely those propositions with credence 1.1 Then, for all a ∈ [0,1], the agent be-
lieves that x ∈ [0,1]\{a} since [0,1]\{a} is measure 1. However, the agent does not
1 Note that this does not rely on the agent’s belief being reduced to credence in any way. However,
see [14].
4believe that for all a ∈ [0,1], x ∈ [0,1]\{a} since ⋂a∈[0,1]([0,1]\{a}) =∅, which is
not measure 1. Hence the agent in this situation does not believe that all her beliefs
are true.
The above of course does not constitute a decisive argument that Immod is not
valid for ideal agents or ideal beliefs axiomatized by KD45. But we hope that at least
we have demonstrated some interest that people might have in considering a logic
without Immod. On the semantic side, though, as we will show in Section 2, if we
adopt the standard possible-world semantics, Immod as formalized by B∀p(Bp→ p)
is valid on any Kripke frame that validates KD45. Indeed, it is valid so long as the
accessibility relation is shift-reflexive,2 regardless of which domain of propositions
(as represented by subsets of possible-worlds) we choose for the propositional quan-
tifiers to range over and regardless of whether the domain varies from world to world.
In other words, if we constrain ourselves with the standard possible-world semantics,
the space of logics between KD45 and KD45 plus Immod is closed to us.
To allow for modesty above KD45, we will turn to algebraic semantics. In alge-
braic semantics, propositions, instead of possible worlds, are first-class citizens that
naturally form Boolean algebras when ordered by logical strength. Then, proposi-
tional quantifiers are interpreted in these algebras of propositions by the meet oper-
ation since, intuitively, for example, “everything I believe is true” is the conjunction
of all instances of “if I believe that p then p.” Specifically, we will use what was used
in the first algebraic semantics for a KD45 belief operator in [49]: proper filter alge-
bras, except that we will consider only those whose underlying Boolean algebra is
complete3 in the sense that arbitrary, not just finite, meets and joins exist. We believe
there can be an independent metaphysical argument for why the Boolean algebra of
propositions should at least be complete, but such an argument falls outside the scope
of this paper. For our purposes, the completeness condition is merely a condition
with which we can show, in a way that does not use any special property of the belief
operator B, that all formulas, including those like ∀pϕ , have well-defined semantic
values. In other words, lattice completeness is a language-and-logic-blind condition
guaranteeing that our algebraic semantics works.
While proper filter algebras allow modesty, they are not completely conceptually
innocent beyond KD45 though. A strengthened introspection axiom, which we call
4∀, is valid on these algebras. This new axiom 4∀ intuitively reads: if the agent be-
lieves every instance of ϕ , then the agent believes that she believes every instance of
ϕ . In the formal language to be introduced in full later, 4∀ is ∀pBϕ→ B∀pBϕ . How-
ever, unlike Immod, we find 4∀ well-motivated, especially when we are considering
extending KD45. Typically, and especially under idealization, we take our judgment
about our internal state, like believing ϕ or not, as infallible. If so, it is not just that
we are in a position to believe that we believe ϕ when we do believe ϕ . The aggre-
gation of arbitrarily many such infallible judgments is still infallible (contrary to a
large aggregation of credence 1 yet fallible propositions) and to be believed by us (or
idealized versions of us). The formula 4∀ precisely formalizes this reasoning step.
2 A binary relation R is shift-reflexive if and only if for all x and y, xRy implies yRy. Shift-reflexivity
follows from Euclidicity, the first-order correspondence of the axiom 5.
3 Since the word “complete” is also used for saying that a logic is complete, we sometimes use “lattice
complete” to express this idea.
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Corresponding to this idea is the fact that a proper filter algebra works by keep-
ing a proper filter of propositions in the underlying Boolean algebra as the filter of
“believed propositions” and interprets Bϕ to either the top element or the bottom el-
ement depending on whether ϕ is interpreted as a “believed proposition” or not. If
the proposition expressed by ϕ is “believed”, then Bϕ is interpreted as the top ele-
ment and otherwise the bottom element. More technically, proper filter algebras can
be understood as Boolean algebras with an operator that validate KD45 and also has
the special property that the operator sends propositions to either the top element or
the bottom element. Intuitively, then, from the agent’s perspective, a formula Bϕ is
as true as tautologies are once true and is as false as contradictions are once false.4
Hence, it is not hard to check that 4∀ is valid, since we are essentially only considering
the two-element Boolean algebra once we treat Bϕ as a whole.
But will this class of complete proper filter algebras validate any other formu-
las whose interpretation might be unwelcome? Our axiomatization suggests that the
answer is no. We will show that the logic of complete proper filter algebras is ax-
iomatized by KD4∀5Π, obtained by adding to KD45 the usual Π-principles, namely
those axioms about propositional quantifiers that are analogous to the axioms about
first-order quantifiers, and then strengthening 4 to 4∀. Since the Π-principles encode
only the quantificational axioms, like instantiation and universalization, the only con-
ceptual leap in this axiomatization is from 4 to 4∀.
1.2 Axiomatizability for modal logics with propositional quantifiers
Now we turn to a more technical side and connect our work to the literature on
modal logics with propositional quantifiers. The systematic technical study of propo-
sitional quantifiers is arguably initiated in Fine’s dissertation [19], though already in
Kripke’s [40], propositional quantifiers are discussed. Also around the same time as
Fine’s dissertation were Bull’s [11] and Gabbay’s [25]. Soon after his dissertation,
Fine summarized and extended his results in [20]. From these early papers, we can
already see a wide range of semantic choices, especially about the domain of propo-
sitions that ∀p can quantify over (which is naturally encoded in general frames). Bull
and Gabbay in the above-cited papers also identified two ways to refute Barcan’s
schema ∀pϕ → ∀pϕ through varying the domain of propositions for quantifiers
across possible-worlds and through generalizing accessibility relations to neighbor-
hood functions. In a completely non-technical paper [29], we also saw perhaps the
earliest proposal of treating ∀p as quantifying directly over objects in a lattice of
4 Of course a tautology like p→ p and a formula like Bp have different truth conditions, regardless
of whether Bp is true or not. So the proper filter algebras we consider are not representing propositions
obtained by way of metaphysical (or a priori) equivalence where two sentences ϕ and ψ express the same
proposition iff necessarily (or a priori) ϕ and ψ are either both true or both false. The proper filter algebras
represent algebras of propositions obtained for a particular agent in a particular situation by stipulating
that two sentences ϕ and ψ express the same proposition iff the agent is certain in that situation that either
ϕ and ψ are both true or both false. For those who are unsatisfied with the restrictedness of proper filter
algebras, we will show that we can, without changing the logic, consider all complete Boolean algebras
with an operator validating KD45. In this way, we can be more neutral on what count as “propositions”.
However, it is non-trivial to see that 4∀ is valid on all such algebras, and we devote the whole of Section 3
to this issue.
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Fig. 1 The frame classes cube. Darker shade means the corresponding logic with propositional quanti-
fiers is non-axiomatizable. No shade means decidability established, and light shade means decidability
unknown.
propositions, a proposal perhaps inspired by the philosophical stance defended in
that paper. Since then, there has been a steady stream of interest devoted to this
topic, with general theoretical results focusing on expressive power under the stan-
dard possible-world semantics ([35, 42, 43, 48]), specific results mostly establishing
non-axiomatizability ([1,23,24,27,37–39,41,53]) with the exception of [39] and [53],
and more application-oriented works: [4–8, 18, 21].
A remarkable phenomenon when studying unimodal logic with propositional
quantifiers on Kripke frames, where every set of possible-worlds counts as a propo-
sition that ∀p can quantify over, is the seeming existence of what we call an “ax-
iomatizability boundary”: there seems to be a line in the order structure of classes of
Kripke frames of usual normal modal logics such that, below this line, the logics of
those classes of frames with propositional quantifiers are extremely complex (often
recursively equivalent to full second-order logic) and non-axiomatizable, while above
this line, the logics with propositional quantifiers are suddenly decidable. Of course,
we need to define what is “usual” for this “axiomatizability boundary” concept to
make sense. A very preliminary step is to consider first the lattice of Kripke frame
classes corresponding to the logics in the modal logic cube. We see that Fine’s 1970
paper [20] sets the boundary between S4 and S5 and between B and S5. Kaminski’s
result [35] pushes the boundary further from S4 to S4.2. However, where the bound-
ary lies in the direction from S5 to KD45 and KB5 remained open. In this paper,
we will show that the boundary can be pushed from the decidable side to KD45: the
logic with propositional quantifiers of Kripke frames validating KD45 is decidable.
We may just focus on Kripke frames if we are only aiming at pushing the ax-
iomatizability boundary. But also hard to ignore in this literature is a severe lack of
an algebraic approach (until very recently; [32], [33], and [16]). In particular, when
propositional quantifiers are added to a modal logic L in the basic language, this
is usually done by considering some class of Kripke frames on which L is valid and
then generating the logic with propositional quantifiers of this class of Kirpke frames.
The main variability is in changing the domain of propositions for the propositional
quantifiers to quantify over, and this is often achieved by considering general frames
whose underlying Kripke frames are frames of L. Then in a general frame, the domain
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for interpreting propositional variables and for propositional quantifiers is naturally
the set of admissible propositions. A problem with this approach, however, is that
when we take ∀p to mean “no matter what p stands for,” which is the interpretation
we are interested in here, the semantics must validate the full instantiation axiom
∀pϕ → ϕ[ψ/p] where ϕ[ψ/p] is the result of substituting p with ψ (with necessary
renaming of bound propositional variables). In general frames, validating the full in-
stantiation axiom often involves putting a so-called “closed under formula” condition,
which seems to be dependent on the choice of L.
In the algebraic semantics for propositional quantifiers, the lattice completeness
of an algebra of propositions ensures the well definedness of the semantic value of all
formulas and the validity of the full instantiation axioms. While the lattice complete-
ness condition is usually not necessary for this purpose, it is blind to the choice of
language and logic. The semantics also directly models the intended interpretation of
∀p: the semantic value of ∀pϕ on an algebra is the meet of all the possible semantic
values of ϕ as we reevaluate p to all elements in the algebra. Hence, the algebraic
method, in contrast to the above possible-world-based method, of adding proposi-
tional quantifiers to L is to take the logic, in the language extended with propositional
quantifiers, of the complete Boolean algebras with operators validating L. One can
then investigate the result of imposing atomicity and/or complete multiplicativity. In
particular, if both conditions are imposed, we recover the version of possible-world-
based method of extension where all subsets count as propositions.
The algebraic approach poses also a series of natural open questions, and we
will list some in the concluding section of this paper. An example, relating to the
above phenomenon of the “axiomatizability boundary”, is this: how would a shift
from Kripke frames to complete BAOs affect the boundary? Will the boundary move
or even blur in the sense that we will see logics undecidable yet not as complex
as theories like the second-order theory of arithmetic? In all the proofs of non-
axiomatizability, atomicity is at least implicit in the set-up, if not directly used. It
is not our ambition in this paper to settle questions at this level of generality though.
Our aim is merely to initiate this program by focusing on a very special case: the case
of extending KD45 with propositional quantifiers in an algebraic way. And we obtain
the following results from a few more general theorems that we will establish along
the way:
– If we consider all complete BAOs validating KD45, the resulting logic is KD4∀5Π.
Note that in principle we can consider the wider class of BAOs which happen to
make the semantics well-defined and also validate KD45. In particular, the Linden-
baum algebra of KD45Π is such an algebra. So if we drop the lattice completeness
condition, we get KD45Π. Conditioning on KD45Π( KD4∀5Π, this means that lat-
tice completeness is not inert: it strengthens 4 into 4∀.
– Imposing complete multiplicativity of B amounts to adding Immod (or Barcan’s
schema) to KD4∀5Π.
– Imposing atomicity amounts to adding a much more complicated formula, which
we will call At, to KD4∀5Π.
8– Hence, if both conditions are imposed, the resulting logic is KD4∀5ΠImmodAt.
By duality theory, then, this is the logic of serial, transitive, and Euclidean Kripke
frames.
– Finally, all the logics above are decidable. Hence the “axiomatizaiblity boundary”
is pushed to KD45 and does not change when we switch from Kripke frame to
complete BAOs.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formally define the lan-
guage and algebraic semantics, and then introduce the necessary axioms and systems
with some of their logical relations; we then show how the algebraic semantics can
invalidate Immod while to a certain extent frame-based semantics cannot. In section 3,
we show that 4∀, and hence the logic KD4∀5Π, is valid on all complete KD45 algebras.
In section 4, we show that KD4∀5Π is complete with respect to the class of all com-
plete proper filter algebras. Since complete proper filter algebras are also complete
KD45 algebras, KD4∀5Π axiomatizes the logic of both complete KD45 algebras and
complete proper filter algebras and also any class of algebras in between. This is the
longest section of the paper, in which we need to prove two technical lemmas. The
first lemma is an analog of the quantifier elimination used to show the completeness
of S5Π by Fine. While we do not need a full quantifier elimination, we need to show
that the quantifiers can be separated from unmodalized propositional variables and
pulled out from the scopes of modal operators so that we can translate formulas into
a first-order language about Boolean algebras with two named elements. The second
lemma at its core says that the first-order logic of the quotients of complete Boolean
algebras is just the first-order logic of Boolean algebras. While this seems to be a nat-
ural proposition of independent interest, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been
shown previously. In section 5, we extract more results from the proofs in Section
4 and establish two general completeness theorems. From them, the logics resulting
from imposing atomicity and complete multiplicativity to algebras naturally follow.
We then show a general decidability theorem, from which the decidability of all the
particular logics discussed follows. In the last section, Section 6, we conclude with
directions of future research.
2 Syntax, semantics, logics, and the problem of Immod
The propositional language with a belief operator and propositional quantifiers is
defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 Define the languageLΠ by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | > | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | Bϕ | ∀pϕ
where p ∈ Prop, a set of propositional variables.5 We adopt the usual abbreviations,
and in particular we frequently write ⊥ for ¬>, B̂ for ¬B¬, and ∃p for ¬∀p¬. The
5 In contrast, > can be viewed as a propositional constant.
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free and bound occurrences of propositional variables are defined as in first-order
logic. As is common in first-order logic, we write ϕ(p) to note that ϕ(ψ) is then the
result of replacing the free occurrences of p in ϕ by ψ with necessary renaming of
bound variables.
Now we turn to semantics. Algebraic semantics starts with a Boolean algebra of
propositions, and every formula will be evaluated to one of the propositions in it. If
we define Boolean algebras simply by the laws of conjunction and negation, then the
semantics seems to lack motivation independent of the logic we want it to generate.
However, it is also well known (see Chap. 4 of [15]) that they can be equivalently de-
fined as partial orders with greatest lower bounds (meets), least upper bounds (joins),
and complements, or more specifically, complemented distributive lattices. Thus, a
Boolean algebra can be seen as representing propositions that form a complemented
distributive lattice once ordered by their strength. Then>, ∧, ∨, and ¬ are interpreted
uncontroversially as the top element, the meet (greatest lower bound) operation, the
join (least upper bound) operation, and the complementation operation, respectively.
In the same fashion, ∀pϕ should express the proposition that is the meet of all
propositions expressible as ϕ while the proposition expressed by p ranges over all
propositions in the algebra. Since there are possibly infinitely many such proposi-
tions expressible by ϕ , we make a further assumption about the Boolean algebra of
propositions we study in this paper: they must be complete in the sense that every set
of elements has a meet. As for the belief operator, the most general representation
we can have is to use an arbitrary function on each algebra of propositions. But since
our concern in this paper is to study the logics of belief at least as strong as KD45,
we need to make corresponding assumptions on this function representing the belief
operator. The following definition summarizes the assumptions we make.
Definition 2.2 A KD45 algebra is a pairB = 〈B,〉 where
– B is a non-trivial Boolean algebra with> being its top element, ¬ its complemen-
tation operation, and ∧ its meet relation, and
–  is a unary function on B such that for all a,b ∈ B,
>=>, (a∧b) =a∧b, ¬¬>=>, a =a, and ¬a =¬a.
When we need to distinguish the operations from different algebras, we will subscript
the operations by the algebra they are from. For example, we may write ∧B for the
meet operation of the Boolean algebra part ofB or write ∧B for the meet operation of
B. We also write ≤, possibly with subscripts, for Boolean lattice orderings. We will
frequently write x ∈B instead of x ∈ B, which is already an abbreviation of x being
in the carrier set of B. The usual abbreviations for ∨,→,↔,⊕,\,⊥, and ♦ apply too.
A complete KD45 algebra is a KD45 algebra whose Boolean algebra part is a
complete Boolean algebra. We use
∧
and
∨
for arbitrary meets and joins in complete
Boolean algebras. Again, subscripts are added and dropped as needed.
Then the language LΠ can be interpreted on any complete KD45 algebra. To
express semantic substitution, for any function f : X → Y and any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ,
we write f [y/x] for the function that is identical to f except that f [y/x](x) = y. This
notation will be used by all the semantics we define in this paper.
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Definition 2.3 For any complete KD45 algebraB, a valuation θ onB is a function
from Prop toB. Then an valuation θ onB can be uniquely extended to θ˜ :LΠ→B
recursively by the following clauses:
– θ˜(p) = θ(p);
– θ˜(¬ϕ) = ¬θ˜(ϕ), θ˜(ϕ ∧ψ)θ˜(ϕ)∧ θ˜(ψ), and θ˜(>) =>;
– θ˜(Bϕ) =θ˜(ϕ);
– θ˜(∀pϕ) =∧a∈B θ˜ [a/p](ϕ).
A formula ϕ ∈LΠ is valid in a complete KD45 algebra B if for all valuations θ
onB, θ˜(ϕ) = 1; otherwise we call it refutable inB. A formula ϕ is valid on a class
of complete KD45 algebras if ϕ is valid on each member of that class, and a set of
formulas is valid on a class whenever every formula in the set is valid on the class.
As usual, validity is denoted by .
One problem with the Definition 2.3 is that it is very general, and little structure of
these complete KD45 algebras is revealed in the definition. While we will study them
in detail in Section 3, we now introduce a very concrete semantics whose structures
in which we evaluate formulas can be seen as directly modeling doxastic scenarios
of ideal agents.
Definition 2.4 A proper filter algebraB is a pair 〈B,F〉where B is a Boolean algebra
and F is a proper filter of that Boolean algebra. A complete proper filter algebra is a
proper filter algebra whose Boolean algebra part is a complete Boolean algebra. We
will write FB if the context is not clear enough.
Definition 2.5 For any complete proper filter algebra B = 〈B,F〉, a valuation θ is
a function from Prop to B. Any valuation θ on B extends to a LΠ−valuation θ˜ :
LΠ→ B given by:
– the same clauses for propositional variables p ∈ Prop, connectives >,¬,∧, and
∀p as in Definition 2.3, and
– θ˜(Bϕ) => when θ˜(ϕ) ∈ F and otherwise θ˜(Bϕ) =⊥.
The concept of validity is defined as in Definition 2.3.
As we have discussed, a proper filter algebra can be seen as representing the propo-
sitions individuated by equivalence up to subjective certainty in a concrete doxastic
scenario, with the proper filter representing the believed propositions in the scenario.
That the believed propositions should form a proper filter comes from the assumption
that the agent is logically competent and never believes in blatantly false propositions.
That θ˜(Bϕ) is always either> or⊥ depending on whether θ˜(ϕ) is in the filter of be-
lieved propositions or not comes from the assumption that the agent is sufficiently
introspective. Proper filter algebras were first seen in [49] as models for beliefs.
The connection between proper filter algebras and KD45 algebras is this: proper
filter algebras naturally correspond to those KD45 algebras whose operator’s range
is {>,⊥}. In [9], KD45 algebras are called pseudo-monadic algebras, and those with
the said property are called well-connected ones, so here we call the above property
well-connectedness too.
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The correspondence can be easily specified. For any proper filter algebra 〈B,F〉,
we can define a F by F a => if a ∈ F and ⊥ otherwise. Then 〈B,F〉 is the well-
connected KD45 algebra corresponding to 〈B,F〉. Conversely, given a well-connected
KD45 algebra 〈B,〉, we can define F = {a ∈ B | a = >}. Then, 〈B,F〉 is the
corresponding proper filter algebra. It is easy to verify that these two constructions are
both bijections and are inverse of each other. Moreover, the semantic value of every
formula is preserved for any valuation θ when we replace either a  operator by the
corresponding filter F or vice versa. We can also show that the correspondence is a
natural isomorphism between the category of proper filter algebras and the category
of well-connected KD45 algebras. But for our purposes in this paper, this step is
unnecessary.
With the semantics of interest defined, we now move on to define logics. The
interpretation of ∀pϕ above in the algebraic semantics is informed by its intended
reading: “for all proposition p, ϕ .” Given this reading, even without formal semantics,
the following axiom schemas and rules for propositional quantifiers, which we call
the Π-principles, should be most certain:
– Dist : ∀p(ϕ → ψ)→ (∀pϕ →∀pψ),
– Inst : ∀pϕ→ϕ[ψ/p], whereψ is subtitutable for p in ϕ and ϕ[ψ/p] is the result
of replacing all free occurrences of p in ϕ by ψ ,
– Vacu : ϕ →∀pϕ , if p is not free in ϕ ,
– Univ : whenever ϕ is a theorem, ∀pϕ is also a theorem.
Just like a normal modal logic in full generality is defined as a set of formulas that
contains all instances of propositional tautologies and the K axiom schema and is
closed under the necessitation and modus ponens rules, we can similarly define nor-
mal Π-logics.
Definition 2.6 A normal Π-logic in a language L ⊇LΠ is a set of formulas in L
that contains all instances of propositional tautologies, K for B, and the Π-principles,
and is closed under the necessitation rule Nec for B, the universalization rule Univ
for ∀p for all p ∈ Prop, and modus ponens.
In this paper, we only consider normal Π-logics. When we put names of axiom
schemas with K and Π together, we always mean the smallest normal Π-logic con-
taining all instances of those axiom schemas. The ambient language should be clear
from the context. For example, in this section we can write KΠ for the smallest nor-
mal Π-logic and write KD45Π for the smallest normal Π-logic inLΠ containing all
instances of D, 4, and 5. In a later section where we prove the main completeness
theorem, we will consider extended languages.
Now that the syntax, semantics, and Π-logics are all formally defined, recall the
three principles about belief we have seen in Section 1:
Immod : B∀p(Bp→ p), Bc : ∀pBϕ → B∀pϕ, 4∀ : ∀pBϕ → B∀pBϕ.
Now we may have 8 normal Π-logics extending KD45Π by choosing which ones of
the above three axiom schemas to add. But the following observation is immediate.
Proposition 2.1 KD45Π4∀ = KD4∀5Π and KD45ΠBc= KD4∀5ΠImmod.
12
KD45Π
KD4∀5Π
(KD45Π4∀)
KD45ΠImmod
KD45ΠBc (KD45Π4∀Bc,KD45ΠImmodBc,KD45Π4∀ImmodBc,KD45Π4∀Immod)
Fig. 2 Normal Π-logics extending KD45Π generated by 4∀, Immod, and Bc.
Proof For the first equality, it is enough to show that we can prove all instances of 4
in KD4∀5Π. But for any ϕ , letting p be a propositional variable not free in ϕ , we have
the following derivation:
1. Bϕ →∀pBϕ [Vacu]
2. ∀pBϕ → B∀pBϕ [4∀]
3. B∀pBϕ → BBϕ [Inst, K, modus ponens]
4. Bϕ → BBϕ [modus ponens]
To show that KD45ΠBc = KD4∀5ΠImmod, it is enough to notice that KD45Π easily
derives the following implications:
– (∀pBBϕ → B∀pBϕ)→ (∀pBϕ → B∀pBϕ),
– (∀pB(Bp→ p)→ B∀p(Bp→ p))→ B∀p(Bp→ p),
– ((∀pBϕ → B∀pBϕ)∧B∀p(Bp→ p))→ (∀pBϕ → B∀pϕ). uunionsq
This proposition shows that there can be at most 4 different normal Π-logics ex-
tending KD45Π: KD45Π itself, KD4∀5Π, KD45ΠImmod, and KD45ΠBc. If they are all
different, then we will have the simple 4-element Boolean algebra as shown in Figure
2. But are they all different?
With the algebraic semantics above, we can easily show that KD4∀5Π 6` Immod,
matching our intuition in the introduction that Immod is refutable even for ideally
introspective agents. Then we see that KD4∀5Π is strictly below KD45ΠBc, and con-
sequently KD45Π must also be strictly below KD45ΠImmod by some simple Boolean
reasoning. Thus with algebraic semantics, we can at least distinguish the lower left
part from the upper right part. To show that KD4∀5Π 6` Immod, we only need a sound-
ness theorem and refutation. The soundness theorem is easy.
Theorem 2.1 For any ϕ ∈ KD4∀5Π, ϕ is valid on all complete proper filter algebras.
Proof The only interesting axiom here is 4∀. Pick an arbitrary complete proper filter
algebraB and a valuation θ on it. Now for any a ∈B, θ˜ [a/p](Bϕ) is either > or ⊥.
If there is an a ∈B such that θ˜ [a/p](Bϕ) = ⊥, then θ˜(∀pBϕ) = ⊥. Then trivially
θ˜(∀pBϕ→B∀pBϕ) =>. On the other hand, if no such a exists, then θ˜(∀pBϕ) =>,
and hence θ˜(B∀pBϕ) =>. Then trivially θ˜(∀pBϕ→ B∀pBϕ) =>. So θ˜(∀pBϕ→
B∀pBϕ) => is valid either way. uunionsq
To refute Immod, we first make the following useful and intuitive observation. It is
intuitive because ∀p(Bp→ p) says that “everything the agent believes is true,” and
the filter FB of a proper filter algebra represents the set of propositions the agent
believes.
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Proposition 2.2 For any complete proper filter algebra B and any valuation θ on
it, θ˜(∀p(Bp→ p)) =∧FB .
Proof If θ˜(p) ∈ FB, then θ˜(Bp) = >, and hence θ˜(Bp → p) = θ˜(p) = θ(p). If
θ˜(p) 6∈FB, then θ˜(Bp)=⊥, and hence θ˜(Bp→ p)=>. Thus {θ˜ [a/p](Bp→ p) | a∈
B} is precisely FB (note that>must be in FB). Then θ˜(∀p(Bp→ p)) is the meet of
this set, i.e.,
∧
FB . uunionsq
Given this observation, to refute Immod = B∀p(Bp→ p), we only need to find a
complete proper filter algebra B such that the meet of FB is not in FB: it is a non-
principal filter.
Proposition 2.3 Immod is not valid on all complete proper filter algebras.
Proof LetB be a complete proper filter algebra where its Boolean algebra is℘(N),
and its filter FB is the set of all cofinite sets. Fix an arbitrary valuation θ . Clearly∧
FB = /0, the bottom element. Using the previous proposition, θ˜(∀p(Bp→ p)) =⊥,
but ⊥ 6∈ FB . Thus θ˜(Immod) =⊥. uunionsq
In fact, in this algebra, θ˜(∃p(Bp∧¬p)) = > ∈ FB, so θ˜(B∃p(Bp∧¬p)) = >. In
other words, this agent believes that there is a proposition she falsely believes.
Now we show the difficulty of invalidating Immod using possible-world-based
semantics. In full generality, allowing propositional contingency in the sense that the
domain of propositions for each possible-world may vary, a frame is a tuple F =
〈W,R,P〉 where W is a set (of possible worlds), R is a binary relation (representing
doxastic accessibility among worlds), and P is a function from W to℘(℘(W )) so that
P(w) represents the propositions that “exist” at w. To be fully general, we disregard
any notion of “coherence” one might want to impose on F (see [22] for some natural
restrictions for F). A model is a tupleM = 〈F,w,V 〉 where w is in the W of F and V
is a function from Prop to V (w). To maintain that the range of V is always in P(w) as
we evaluate formulas with modalities, we add it to the definition of a frame that P is
non-decreasing: if wRw′ then P(w)⊆ P(w′). Then the truth clauses can be defined as
usual:
〈F,w,V 〉  p ⇐⇒ w ∈V (p);
〈F,w,V 〉  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ 〈F,w,V 〉 6 ϕ;
〈F,w,V 〉  ϕ ∧ψ ⇐⇒ 〈F,w,V 〉  ϕ and 〈F,w,V 〉  ψ;
〈F,w,V 〉  Bϕ ⇐⇒ for all w′ ∈ R(w),〈F,w′,V 〉  ϕ;
〈F,w,V 〉  ∀pϕ ⇐⇒ for all X ∈ P(w),〈F,w,V [X/p]〉  ϕ.
Here R(w)= {w′ ∈W |wRw′}. Then ϕ being valid on a frame F is defined as 〈F,w,V 〉
making ϕ true for all suitable w and V .
A lot of standard questions can be asked about this semantics. But for now, ob-
serve that for any frame F = 〈W,R,P〉, if R is shift-reflexive, meaning that every world
in R(w) is reflexive for all w ∈W , then F validates Immod. To see this, first note that
for every w in W such that wRw and any suitable valuation V , 〈F,w,V 〉  Bp→ p
simply by the truth clause of B. Hence ∀p(Bp→ p) is also always true on reflexive
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points by the truth clause of ∀p. Then, it is clear again from the truth clause of B that
for any w∈W such that every w′ ∈R(w) is reflexive, 〈F,w,V 〉B∀p(Bp→ p). Thus,
if R is shift-reflexive, Immod is validated. And in showing this, P is totally unused.
Does the above argument show that possible-world semantics is totally unusable
if we want to model scenarios where Immod is false? If one is looking for intuitive
and “clean” models, then the argument does suggest that possible-world semantics
is not useful. The success of possible-world semantics is partly due to the easy first-
order conditions corresponding to natural axioms. For the doxastic logic case, D,4,
and 5 correspond to seriality, transitivity, and Euclidicity, respectively. And from Eu-
clidicity alone, shift-reflexivity follows. The above argument shows that if we want
to model failure of Immod while validating KD45, we need to give up the appeal-
ing correspondence theory in the standard possible-world semantics. Nevertheless,
it remains open what this semantics is capable of. We conjecture that with carefully
chosen P and R, we can refute Immod and even 4∀ while validating KD45Π. How-
ever, we are less confident that the R relation in that frame can be interpreted in a
meaningful way.
3 Soundness of 4∀ on complete KD45 algebras
In the last section, we have seen how complete proper filter algebras can be used to
separate Immod from KD4∀5Π and hence separate KD45ΠImmod and KD45ΠBc from
KD45Π and KD4∀5Π. We have also seen that complete proper filter algebras validate
4∀ using the special property that the B operator always brings semantic values to
either the top element or the bottom element.
A natural question then is whether we can separate 4∀ from KD45Π using alge-
braic semantics based on complete Boolean algebras at all. That is, whether we can
refute 4∀ if we do not assume the above special property about B. In this section, we
show that we cannot. In fact, 4∀, and hence KD4∀5Π, are valid on all complete KD45
algebras. For this, we need to extract more structure from complete KD45 algebras
and view the algebraic semantics from a different perspective.
Definition 3.1 For any KD45 algebraB, let fp(B) be the set {a ∈B | a =a}.
Lemma 3.1 For any KD45 algebraB, fp(B) has the following properties.
– First, fp(B) = {a | a ∈B}= {♦a | a ∈B}.
– Second, fp(B) is a subalgebra ofB. That is, fp(B) is closed under the comple-
mentation, the meet operation, and trivially the  operator ofB.
– Third, while 〈fp(B),>B,¬B,∧B〉 is a complete Boolean algebra, it is not always
a regular Boolean sublagebra of B. In other words, when ordered as in B by
≤B , fp(B) form a complete Boolean lattice whose complementation operation
and finite meet operation are the same as inB. However, it is not always the case
that fp(B) is closed under arbitrary meets inB.
Proof The first two points follow directly from the definition of KD45 algebras. For
the third point, one can easily verify that the join of X ⊆ fp(B) within fp(B) is
∨B X . To see that for every x∈ X , x≤∨B X , note that since X ⊆ fp(B), x=x.
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Note also that  is monotone. Hence, given that x ≤ ∨B X , x ≤ ∨B X . Thus,
x≤∨B X . Now suppose y ∈ fp(B) and for all x ∈ X , y≥ x. Then y≥ ∨B X . And
then y =y≥∨B X . Hence ∨B X is the least upper bound of X in fp(B).
An example where the join of a subset of fp(B) in B is not in fp(B) is given
below. uunionsq
Definition 3.2 Let N be the set of non-principal ultrafilters in℘(N) and W = Nunionsq
N . For any A ⊆ N, define N (A) = { f ∈ N | A ∈ f}. Then for any subset X ⊆
W , define X by: X = (X ∩N)∪N (X ∩N). Finally, let BN = 〈〈℘(W ),W,W \
·,∩〉,〉.
Proposition 3.1 BN is a complete KD45 algebra. Moreover, fp(BN) is not closed
under arbitrary join inBN.
Proof ClearlyBN is complete since the Boolean algebra base is a powerset algebra.
Now we show that  satisfies all the relevant properties. Pick arbitrary X ,Y ∈BN,
and let X0 = X ∩N,X1 = X ∩N ,Y0 = Y ∩N,Y1 = Y ∩N .
– X ∩Y = (X0 ∪N (X0))∩ (Y0 ∪N (Y0)) = (X0 ∩Y0)∪ (X0 ∩N (Y0))∪ (Y0 ∩
N (X0))∪ (N (X0)∩N (Y0)) = (X0∩Y0)∪N (X0∩Y0) =(X0∩Y0). Here we
used the fact that an ultrafilter contains X0 and Y0 iff it contains X0∩Y0.
– ∅=∅∪N (∅) =∅.
– X =(X0∪N (X0)) = ((X0∪N (X0))∩N)∪N ((X0∪N (X0))∩N) = X0∪
N (X0) =X .
– ¬X = ¬(X0∪N (X0)) = (N\X0)∪ (N \N (X0)) = (N\X0)∪N (N\X0) =
(¬X ∩N)∪N (¬X ∩N) =¬X . Hence by the previous part¬X =¬X =
¬X = ¬X .
Thus,BN is a complete KD45 algebra. Note also that for every n∈N, {n} ∈ fp(BN).
However, N=
⋃
n∈N{n} is not in fp(BN). uunionsq
Semantically, every formula obtained by combining propositional variables with
propositional operators (Boolean or modal) and propositional quantifiers defines a
function from valuations inBProp toB. Now we study these functions.
For simplicity and clarity, we fix an arbitrary complete KD45 algebra B and
define V =BProp. Greek letters “θ” and “γ” are used to denote valuations in V and
“ f ” and “g” are used to denote functions from valuations in V toB. We also use the
notations from lambda calculus to define functions.
The following definition then defines the meaning of the operators in terms of
how they generate functions fromBProp toB.
Definition 3.3 First, for every p ∈ Prop, define [p] = λθ ∈ V,θ(p). Then, for any
f ,g : V →B and p ∈ Prop, define:
f ∧g = λθ ∈V, f (θ)∧g(θ);
¬ f = λθ ∈V,¬ f (θ);
 f = λθ ∈V, f (θ);
∀p f = λθ ∈V,
∧
{ f (θ [a/p]) | a ∈B}.
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Then f ∨ g, f → g, f ↔ g, f ⊕ g, ♦ f , and ∃p f are defined in the obvious way. We
call the set of functions generated by ¬, ∧,, and ∀p for all p ∈ Prop from {[p] | p ∈
Prop} the set of definable functions onB.
The above definition also gives us an alternative way to define the semantics forLΠ.
Definition 3.4 Recall that we have defined [p] = λθ ∈ V,θ(p). We can then extend
this notation to all formulas inLΠ inductively in the obvious way:
[¬ϕ] = ¬[ϕ];
[ϕ ∧ψ] = [ϕ]∧ [ψ];
[Bϕ] =[ϕ];
[∀pϕ] = ∀p[ϕ].
Proposition 3.2 For any ϕ ∈LΠ, θ˜(ϕ) = [ϕ](θ) for all θ ∈V .
Now we identify two properties of these functions from V toB that are important
to us.
Definition 3.5 For any f : V →B, we say that f is fixed if its range is in fp(B) (that
is,  f = f ); and we say that f is local if for any p ∈ Prop and θ ∈V ,
if b≤ a1↔ a2, then b≤ f (θ [a1/p])↔ f (θ [a2/p]),
for all b ∈ fp(B) and a1,a2 ∈B.
The intuition behind locality is that for f to be local, what f is below a fixpoint
b ∈ fp(B) (namely what f ∧ b is) should only depend on what the arguments are
below b (namely what θ(p)∧b is for all p ∈ Prop). The above definition formalizes
this intuition because in Boolean algebras, x≤ y↔ z iff x∧ y = x∧ z.
But why are these two properties important to us? Recall that what we are trying
to show here is that ∀pBϕ → B∀pBϕ is valid on B. If we can show that [∀pBϕ] is
fixed, which means that [∀pBϕ] =[∀pBϕ], then we are done. This is because, with
[∀pBϕ] being fixed, for any θ ∈V ,
θ˜(∀pBϕ) = [∀pBϕ](θ) = ([∀pBϕ])(θ) = [B∀pBϕ](θ) = θ˜(B∀pBϕ).
Obviously, then, θ˜(∀pBϕ → B∀pBϕ) = >. So our goal is now reduced to showing
that [∀pBϕ] is fixed. Note that [∀pBϕ] = ∀p[ϕ]. It is trivial to see that[ϕ] is fixed.
So one might hope that we can show that if f is fixed, then ∀p is also fixed, and then
claim victory. However, this is in general false, given the example we produced in
Definition 3.2 above showing that the set of fixpoints fp(B) is in general not closed
under arbitrary meets. One can construct an f whose range (when we vary the p
coordinate of the input valuation) is precisely a set of fixpoints in fp(B) whose meet
is not in fp(B). Then ∀p f is not fixed. What is missing in this strategy of showing
that ∀p f is fixed whenever f is fixed is precisely locality. We will show first that [Bϕ]
must be local in addition to being fixed. We will then show that if f is fixed and local,
then ∀p f is fixed and local.
To show that [Bϕ] is local, the following lemma, showing in fact that all definable
functions are local, suffices.
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Lemma 3.2 We have the following closure properties for local functions.
– Projection functions of the form [p] for some p ∈ Prop are local.
– Local functions are closed under Boolean combinations: if f ,g :V→B are local,
then f ∧g and ¬ f are both local.
– Local functions are closed under .
– Local functions are closed under ∀p for all p ∈ Prop.
Hence, all definable functions are local.
Proof The first two points are easy. For the third, consider f where f is local. Then
for a b ∈ fp(B), we need to show that
if b≤ a1↔ a2, then b≤ f (θ [a1/p])↔ f (θ [a2/p]).
Given that f is local, when b ≤ a1 ↔ a2, b ≤ f (θ [a1/p])↔ f (θ [a2/p]). Box both
sides (using that  is monotone), and we see that
b =b≤( f (θ [a1/p])↔ f (θ [a2/p]))≤ f (θ [a1/p])↔ f (θ [a2/p]).
The first equality is due to that b ∈ fp(B), and the last inequality is by the normality
of : it commutes with finite meets, and (x→ y)≤x→y.
Now, for the fourth point, consider ∀p f where f is local. In this case, we need
to work with an arbitrary q ∈ Prop, an arbitrary b ∈ fp(B), and arbitrary a1,a2 ∈B
such that b≤ a1↔ a2, and show that
b≤
∧
{ f (θ [a1/q][c/p]) | c ∈B}↔
∧
{ f (θ [a2/q][c/p]) | c ∈B}.
If q = p, then this is trivially true (the right-hand-side of the inequality is >). So we
now consider the case when q 6= p, in which case θ [a1/q][c/p] = θ [c/p][a1/q] and
θ [a2/q][c/p] = θ [c/p][a2/q]. For simplicity, let θc = θ [c/p]. Since we assumed that
f is local, by definition, we have the following for all c ∈B:
b≤ f (θc[a1/q])↔ f (θc[a2/q]).
Thus, b ≤ ∧{ f (θc[a1/q])↔ f (θc[a2/q]) | c ∈ B}. Hence, all we need now is the
following simple principle on complete Boolean algebras:∧
{ f (θc[a1/q])↔ f (θc[a2/q]) | c ∈B} ≤∧
{ f (θc[a1/q]) | c ∈B}↔
∧
{ f (θc[a2/q]) | c ∈B}.
To see that in general,
∧
i∈I(xi↔ yi)≤
∧
i∈I xi↔
∧
i∈I yi, note that it is enough to show
that
∧
i∈I(xi↔ yi)∧
∧
i∈I xi ≤
∧
i∈I yi and symmetrically that
∧
i∈I xi↔ yi ∧
∧
i∈I yi ≤∧
i∈I xi. Both of them are easy. uunionsq
That [Bϕ] is fixed is immediate from the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 We have the following closure properties for fixed functions.
– For any f : V →B,  f is fixed.
– Fixed functions are closed under Boolean combinations.
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– Not all fixed functions are closed under ∀p.
Proof Immediate from Lemma 3.1. uunionsq
The only missing piece then is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4 Fixed local functions are closed under ∀p. That is, if f is fixed and local,
then ∀p f is also fixed and local, for any p ∈ Prop.
Proof Pick an arbitrary fixed and local f : V →B. Since fixed local functions are
closed under Boolean combinations and local functions are closed under ∀p, without
loss of generality, we only need to show that ∃p f is also fixed.
The idea is the following. Pick an arbitrary θ ∈V . Then we show that (∃p f )(θ)
in fact has a witness: there exists c ∈B such that (∃p f )(θ) = f (θ [c/p]). Since f is
fixed, f (θ [c/p]) ∈ fp(B). So, (∃p f )(θ), being just f (θ [c/p]), is in fp(B). Since θ
is arbitrarily chosen, this shows that ∃p f is fixed. As a consequence, ∃p f = ∃p f .
Hence, let us fix an arbitrary θ ∈ V and from now on write f (a) for f (θ [a/p]).
Since f is fixed and local, we know that:
– For any a ∈B, f (a) ∈ fp(B).
– For any b ∈ fp(B) and any a,a′ ∈B such that b≤ a↔ a′, b≤ f (a)↔ f (a′).
Our goal, then, is to show that there is a c ∈B such that f (c) =∨{ f (a) | a ∈B}.
To this end, let F = { f (a) | a ∈B}. We will show soon that F as a poset (with ≤
inherited fromB) has the following two properties:
– (Directed) For any a,b ∈ F , there is a c ∈ F such that a,b≤ c.
– (Chain) For any ascending chain 〈ai〉i≤κ in F , there is t ∈ F such that for all i < κ ,
ai ≤ t.
From these two conditions, it is easy to see that F has an x that is the greatest in F . By
Zorn’s lemma, F has a maximal element. By (Directed), the maximal element given
by Zorn’s lemma must also be the greatest element of F . Hence, the join of F is in F .
Then, anything in f−1(
∨
F) can serve as the witness for (∃p f )(θ) =∨F .
Now we show the two properties. For (Directed), note that F ⊆ fp(B) since f is
fixed. Thus, if we pick b1,b2 ∈ F and a1,a2 ∈B such that f (a1) = b1 and f (a2) = b2,
we can apply locality here. Indeed, let a = (a1 ∧ b1)∨ (a2 ∧ (b2 \ b1)). Note that
b2 \ b1 ∈ fp(B). It is also easy to see that b1 ≤ a↔ a1 and b2 \ b1 ≤ a↔ a2. Then,
b1 ≤ f (a)↔ f (a1) and b2 \b1 ≤ f (a)↔ f (a2). However, by the way we picked a1
and a2, b1 ≤ f (a1) and b2 \ b1 ≤ f (a2). Thus, b1 ≤ f (a), and b2 \ b1 ≤ f (a), and
b1∨b2 ≤ f (a) ∈ F .
For (Chain), we can use the same strategy. Pick an ascending chain 〈bi〉i≤κ in F
for some cardinal κ with a corresponding sequence 〈ai〉i<κ such that f (ai) = bi for
all i < κ . Then inductively define 〈ci〉i<κ by
c0 = a0∧b0;
ci+1 = ci∨ (ai+1∧ (bi+1 \bi));
cλ =
(∨
i<λ
ci
)
∨
(
aλ ∧
(
bλ \ f
(∨
i<λ
ci
)))
.
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By an easy induction, we can see that for all i < κ , ci ≤ bi, (note that (aλ ∧ (bλ \
f (
∨
i<λ ci)))≤ bλ ) and that 〈ci〉i<k is an ascending chain). Less easy is the following:
(1) For all λ ≤ κ , ∨i<λ bi ≤ f (∨i<λ ci).
We use strong induction here, and the base case is trivial. Now suppose as (IH) that
for all δ < λ ,
∨
i<δ bi ≤ f (
∨
i<δ ci). Then our only goal is to show that
∨
i<λ bi ≤
f (
∨
i<λ ci).
– Say λ = α+1. Then
∨
i<λ bi = bα and
∨
i<λ ci = cα since 〈bi〉i<κ and 〈ci〉i<κ are
both ascending chains. Hence we are just showing that bα ≤ f (cα). Now there
are two cases.
– Say α = β +1. Then cα = cβ ∨ (aα ∧ (bα \bβ )). By (IH) applied to α , bβ =∨
i<α bi ≤ f (
∨
i<α ci) = f (cβ ). Note also that bβ ≤ cβ ↔ cα and bα \ bβ ≤
aα ↔ cα . By locality, then, bβ ≤ f (cβ )↔ f (cα) and bα \ bβ ≤ f (aα)↔
f (cα). However, by (IH) and the way we picked aα , bβ ≤ f (cβ ) and bα \bβ ≤
bα ≤ f (aα). Thus bβ ≤ f (cα) and bα \bβ ≤ f (cα). Thus bα ≤ f (cα).
– Say α is a limit ordinal. For convenience let cβ =
∨
i<α ci and bβ = f (cβ ).
Here bβ ∈ fp(B) since f is fixed. By definition, cα = cβ ∨ (aα ∧ (bα \ bβ )).
Now we can apply the same strategy again to show that bα ≤ f (cα).
– Then we consider the interesting case where λ is a limit ordinal. What we need
to show here is that
∨
i<λ bi ≤ f (
∨
i<λ ci), which means for all j < λ , b j ≤
f (
∨
i<λ ci). To show this, pick an arbitrary j < λ . Then consider b j∧
∨
i<λ ci. Here
we claim that this is just c j. First, b j∧∨i<λ ci =∨i<λ (b j∧ci). (This distributivity
law holds on any complete Boolean algebra.) Also, for i ≤ j, b j ∧ ci = ci since
ci ≤ bi for all i < κ . Since 〈ci〉i<κ is ascending, ∨i≤ j(b j ∧ ci) = c j. Thus we only
need to show that for all i such that j ≤ i < λ , b j ∧ci = c j. Obviously we need to
do this by induction. The base case where i = j is trivial (again, by ci ≤ bi). For
the inductive step:
– b j∧ci+1 = (b j∧ci)∨(b j∧ai+1∧(bi+1 \bi)) = (b j∧ci)∨(ai+1∧bi+1∧¬bi∧
b j) = b j ∧ ci = c j. Here the first equality is by distributivity, the second by
simple Boolean reasoning, the third by the fact that j < i and hence b j ≤ bi
and b j ∧¬bi =⊥, and the fourth by the induction hypothesis.
– For a limit ordinal k between j and λ , b j ∧ ck = (b j ∧∨i<k ci)∨ (b j ∧ ak ∧
(bk \ f (∨i<k ci))). Now, by the induction hypothesis that for all i such that
j ≤ i < k, b j ∧ ci = c j, we get that b j ∧∨i<k ci = c j. Recall that we are inside
another induction with (IH) assumed. Applying (IH) to k, we get that b j ≤∨
i<k bi ≤ f (
∨
i<k ci). Hence, b j∧ak∧ (bk \ f (
∨
i<k ci)) =⊥, and b j∧ck = c j.
So, we have shown that b j ∧∨i<λ ci = c j. Adding this to the fact that c j ≤ b j,
b j ≤ ∨i<λ ci ↔ c j. By locality, b j ≤ f (∨i<λ ci)↔ f (c j). But b j ≤ f (c j) since
we can apply (IH) to j+1. Thus, b j ≤ f (∨i<λ ci), and we are done here. uunionsq
Now we put the three lemmas together to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.1 For any ϕ ∈LΠ and any complete KD45 algebraB, 4∀ = ∀pBϕ →
B∀pϕ is valid onB.
Proof LetB be an arbitrary complete KD45 algebra. Then all the definitions, propo-
sitions, and lemmas in this section apply to B. A straightforward induction shows
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that [Bϕ] as defined in Definition 3.4 is a definable function from V to B accord-
ing to Definition 3.3. By Lemma 3.2, it is local. Since [Bϕ] = [ϕ], by Lemma
3.3, it is fixed. Thus, by Lemma 3.4, [∀pBϕ] = ∀p[Bϕ] is also fixed as [Bϕ] is
both fixed and local. Thus, [∀pBϕ] = [∀pBϕ] = [B∀pBϕ], and hence [∀pBϕ →
B∀pBϕ] = [∀pBϕ]→ [B∀pBϕ] = [∀pBϕ]→ [∀pBϕ], which is constantly> since in
any Boolean algebra and for any element x in it, x→ x is the top element. Then, ac-
cording to Proposition 3.2, for any valuation θ onB, θ˜(4∀)= θ˜(∀pBϕ→B∀pBϕ)=
[4∀](θ) =>. Hence, 4∀ is valid onB. uunionsq
Before we move on to the next section, let us briefly reflect on what this theorem
tells us. First, we see that to separate 4∀ from KD45Π using algebraic semantics, we
need to drop the completeness assumption. The difficulty here is that it is not known
which meets and joins we need to make the semantics for all formulas with proposi-
tional quantifiers well defined. One trivial way to get a KD45 algebra on which the
semantics is well defined is to use the Lindenbaum algebra of KD45Π. However, to
show that 4∀ in this algebra does not evaluate to > is plainly equivalent to show-
ing that KD45Π does not prove 4∀, so this is hardly making any progress. What we
need here is a less abstract way to build KD45 algebras on which the semantics is
well defined, and this seems to require a less abstract sufficient condition for the
well-definedness of the semantics that is strictly weaker than lattice completeness.
Another way is to use the semantics with propositional contingency as we sketched
at the end of Section 2. The difficulty there seems to be validating the Π-principles.
Second, we mentioned in Lemma 3.1 that there is a complete KD45 algebra B
such that fp(B) is not closed under arbitrary meets in B. If we examine the syn-
tactical structure of 4∀ = ∀pBϕ → B∀pBϕ , it seems that 4∀ is a candidate formula
whose validity on a KD45 algebra B would correspond to the condition that fp(B)
is closed under arbitrary meets. After all, as we vary the valuation of p, Bϕ picks up
a subset of fp(B). Then the validity of 4∀ says that this meet is below6 the  of this
meet, which then implies, with a bit of manipulation like what we did in Lemma 3.1,
that this meet is also a fixpoint. Of course, this is not to be: while the validity of 4∀
entails that some meets of fixpoints are still fixpoints, it does not correspond to the
condition that the set of fixpoints is closed under arbitrary meets. What is at work
here is that the expressivity constraint of the language is also a constraint on which
sets of fixpoints Bϕ can pick up.
Can there be a way to syntactically capture the condition that the set of fixpoints
is closed under arbitrary meets? One way is to add uninterpreted propositional op-
erators. For example, let LΠO be the language extending LΠ with a unary oper-
ator O. Then, a valuation θ assigns not only an element in B to each propositional
variable, but also a unary function on B to O. The semantics of the formulas in
LΠO under valuation θ can be defined in the obvious way. Then, the validity of
∀pBOp→ B∀pBOp onB corresponds to fp(B) being closed under arbitrary meets.
We leave further investigation of this formalism as future work.
6 Through out this paper, we use “below” in the weak sense when talking about elements in lattices.
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4 Completeness of KD4∀5Π with respect to complete proper filter algebras
In this section, we show the following completeness theorem.
Theorem 4.1 For any ϕ ∈LΠ, if ϕ is valid on all complete proper filter algebras,
then ϕ ∈ KD4∀5Π.
Like most completeness proofs, we can show instead that any non-theorem ϕ of
KD4∀5Π is refuted by a complete proper filter algebra. Then, one strategy particu-
larly suitable for algebraic semantics, also used in [32], is the following:
– Construct the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra B of KD4∀5Π. Automatically, B is a
KD45 algebra, and ϕ is evaluated to a non-top element inB by a naturally defined
valuation.
– Transform B into a complete proper filter algebra C while keeping ϕ evaluated
to a non-top element. The transformation is typically by first turning B into a
proper filter algebra and then using a construction like MacNeille completion.
The problem with this approach is that neither of the standard methods of construct-
ing MacNeille completions of Boolean algebra with operators, namely the lower and
upper MacNeille completions (see [26] or [30]), can be used here. Since proper fil-
ter algebras correspond to well-connected KD45 algebras, we can directly use the
definition of lower or upper MacNeille completion. However, the upper MacNeille
completion of a well-connected KD45 algebra is not necessarily a KD45 algebra (we
leave this to the reader; the proper filter agebra based on the finite-cofinite algebra in
the proof of Proposition 4.1 below can be used to show this as well). The lower Mac-
Neille completion construction does preserve the property of being well-connected
and KD45. When translated to proper filter algebras, we get the following definition.
Definition 4.1 The lower MacNeille completion B of a proper filter algebra B =
〈B,F〉 is 〈B,↑ F〉 where B is the MacNeille completion of B (which can be assumed
to have B as a subalgebra) and ↑ F = {a ∈ B | ∃b ∈ F,b≤B a}.
Intuitively, the lower MacNeille completion of a proper filter algebra is obtained by
first completing the Boolean algebra part and then extending the original filter min-
imally to be a filter in the completed Boolean algebra. The problem with the lower
MacNeille completion construction is that it may change the semantic value of a
sentence from a non-top element to the top element. This means that invalidity, or
equivalently refutability, is not preserved.
Proposition 4.1 There is a sentence ϕ ∈ LΠ and a proper filter algebra B such
that ϕ is invalid inB but is valid in the lower MacNeille completionB.
Proof Let B be the Boolean algebra of finite or cofinite subsets of N and F the set of
cofinite sets of N. Then B = 〈B,F〉 is a proper filter algebra. The lower MacNeille
completionB is then 〈℘(N),F〉 where℘(N) is the powerset algebra of N. Note that,
importantly, the lower MacNeille completion does not change F .
Let ϕ be ∃p(¬Bp∧¬B¬p). For any valuation θ onB, θ˜(ϕ) is ⊥, since θ˜(p) ∈
B is either finite or cofinite, and thus either θ˜(p) or θ˜(¬p) is cofinite. Then either
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θ˜(¬Bp) or θ˜(¬B¬p) is ⊥. This means that θ˜(ϕ) = 0. Now, let θ be a valuation on
B such that θ(p) is the set of even numbers. Then θ(p) is infinite and coinfinite.
Hence θ˜(¬Bp∧¬B¬p) is >, and so θ˜(ϕ) = >. Since ϕ is a sentence with no free
variable, this means that ϕ is valid onB. uunionsq
The lesson from the above example is that, to preserve the invalidity of ∃p(¬Bp∧
¬B¬p), we need to extend F , the filter of cofinite sets, into an ultrafilter. However,
there seems to be no canonical way to do this: every ultrafilter seems as good as any
other. It seems that to prove the completeness of KD4∀5Π, we need a more detailed
analysis of both the algebras and the system itself.
Our approach is based on the following observation: every complete proper filter
algebraB = 〈B,F〉 has a natural quotient Boolean algebra B/F , and a belief formula
in the form of Bϕ , where ϕ contains only Boolean connectives, is asserting that ϕ
evaluates to the top element in the quotient B/F . Hence, Bϕ is talking about the
quotient algebra B/F . With propositional quantifiers,LΠ can in fact talk about B/F
in a first-order way.
Given this observation, we have the following strategy, where we focus on just
the sentences since for any formula, it is valid if and only if its universal closure, the
result of bounding all free variables with universal quantifiers, is valid:
– For a sentence ϕ in LΠ that is valid in all complete proper filter algebras, find
a corresponding ψ in a first-order language for Boolean algebras. This ψ will
be valid on all natural quotient Boolean algebras of all complete proper filter
algebras.
– Show that if a first-order sentence is valid on all natural quotient Boolean algebras
of complete proper filter algebras, then it is in fact valid on all non-trivial Boolean
algerbas. Consequently, ψ will have a proof in the usual first-order logic for all
non-trivial Boolean algebras.
– Translate the first-order proof of ψ into a proof of ϕ in KD4∀5Π.
The main difficulties of implementing this strategy lie in the first two steps. First, in
fact, not every sentence ϕ ∈LΠ can be translated into a first-order sentence to be
evaluated on the natural quotient Boolean algebras. The reason is that a sentence in
LΠ can be evaluated to a proposition that is neither top nor bottom, yet a first-order
sentence can only be true or false. To cope with this, several auxiliary languages will
be introduced, so that we can separate the translatable part and the non-translatable
part of a sentence in LΠ. It turns out that the non-translatable part is well behaved,
so we can proceed with them.
In the second step, a theorem about the natural quotients of complete proper filter
algebras is needed. Essentially, it has to be shown that the non-trivial quotients of
complete Boolean algebras are general enough to validate only those first-order for-
mulas that are valid in all non-trivial Boolean algebras. In other words, the first-order
logic of the non-trivial quotients of complete Boolean algebras is precisely the first-
order logic of all non-trivial Boolean algebras. While the first-order logic remains
the same, it should be mentioned here that there are interesting special properties of
quotients of complete Boolean algebras, e.g., countable separation property (see [36],
Lemma 5.27). Previous results about the quotients of complete Boolean algebras in-
clude [45], [17], and [51]. We will extend the result in [51] to fulfill our purpose.
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The rest of this section is split into four subsections. In §4.1, we define a number
of auxiliary languages, their semantics, and translations between some of them. In
§4.2, we show how the completeness of KD4∀5Π follows from two lemmas resolving
the two difficulties mentioned above. Then, the next two subsections, §4.3 and §4.4,
are devoted to the two lemmas, respectively.
4.1 Auxiliary languages, semantics, and translations
Definition 4.2 Let LΠzg denote the language extending LΠ with two new propo-
sitional constants z and g. For more readability, we sometimes use overline instead
¬ for the negation of formulas and omit the ∧ in a conjunction of literals. Now we
define the following languages:
LBool : t ::= p | > | ¬t | (t ∧ t) where p ∈ Prop;
LBoolzg : ϕ ::= z | g | p | > | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) where p ∈ Prop;
LBΠzg : ϕ ::= Bt | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ∀pϕ where t ∈LBoolzg, p ∈ Prop.
Very roughly speaking, z and g will be used to capture the non-translatable part, and
LBΠzg will be the translatable part. Recall that the main difficulty of translating
LΠ to a first-order logic is that there are sentences in LΠ that evaluate to some
intermediate proposition in some complete proper filter algebra. We will effectively
show later that the Boolean combinations of z and g exhaust all possible semantic
values that a sentence inLΠ can take, and eventually every formula inLΠ is prov-
ably equivalent to a Boolean combination of z, g, and formulas inLBΠzg. It will be
shown later in this section thatLBΠzg is translatable to a first-order language.
The next definition fixes the interpretation of the new constants z and g.
Definition 4.3 For any complete proper filter algebraB = 〈B,F〉, define zB,gB by
zB =
∧
F,
gB =
∨
{a ∈B | a is an atom and a≤ zB}.
The subscripts of zB and gB may be dropped if the context of which algebra we are
talking about is clear.
For any valuation θ on B, we then extend it uniquely to a LΠzg-valuation θ˜ :
LΠzg→ B, using the definition in Definition 2.5 plus two more clauses for z and g:
θ˜(z) = z and θ˜(g) = g.
Under this semantics, g and zg are semantically equivalent, but g and zg are not. For
symmetry, we will mostly use zg instead of g to contrast zg.
It is important to see that for every complete proper filter algebra B, zB and gB
are expressible inLΠ. For this, we introduce a few more abbreviations.
Definition 4.4 Define the following abbreviations:
〈z〉ϕ = B̂(z∧ϕ);
[z]ϕ = B(z→ ϕ);
at(ϕ) = 〈z〉ϕ ∧∀q([z](ϕ → q)∨ [z](ϕ →¬q)).
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Here q is some variable not free in ϕ .
Proposition 4.2 For any complete proper filter algebraB and valuation θ :
1. θ˜(〈z〉ϕ) = θ˜(¬[z]¬ϕ).
2. θ˜(〈z〉ϕ) and θ˜([z]ϕ) are either > or ⊥.
3. θ˜(〈z〉ϕ) => if and only if z∧ θ˜(ϕ) is not ⊥.
4. θ˜([z]ϕ) = > if and only if θ˜(ϕ) ≥ z. In other words, θ˜([z]ϕ) = > if and only if
θ˜(ϕ)∧ z = z.
5. θ˜(at(ϕ)) = θ˜(〈z〉ϕ ∧¬∃q(〈z〉(ϕ ∧q)∧〈z〉(ϕ ∧¬q))) where q is not free in ϕ .
6. θ˜(at(ϕ)) is either > or ⊥. It is the former if and only if z∧ θ˜(ϕ) is an atom in
(the Boolean algebra part of)B.
7. z = θ˜(∀p(Bp→ p)).
8. g = θ˜(∀p(Bp→ p)∧∃p(p∧at(p)).
Proof The last item may need some explanation. The rest are straightforward. To
start, unpack the semantics of θ˜(∀p(Bp→ p)∧∃p(p∧at(p))), and we see that it is
θ˜(∀p(Bp→ p))∧
∨
{θ˜ [a/p](p∧at(p)) | a ∈B}
= z∧
∨
{a∧ θ˜ [a/p](at(p)) | a ∈B}
=
∨
{z∧a∧ θ˜ [a/p](at(p)) | a ∈B}.
Now if a is an atom below z, then z∧ a = a, which is still an atom. Then, given
that θ˜ [a/p] = a and hence z∧ θ˜ [a/p] = z∧a, θ˜ [a/p](at(p)) => according to item 6
above. Then z∧a∧ θ˜ [a/p](at(p)) = a. This means that all atoms below z are included
in the join. On the other hand, if a is not an atom below z, then z∧a∧ θ˜ [a/p](at(p)) =
⊥ since θ˜ [a/p](at(p)) is⊥, again by item 6 above. Thus the join is precisely the join
of atoms below z. uunionsq
It can also be shown that ∃p(p∧ at(p)) expresses the join of those elements whose
meet with z is an atom. However, taking this as a primitive seems to be less convenient
for later work.
Now we focus on the fragmentLBΠzg and show in what sense it can be seen as
talking about the natural quotients of complete proper filter algebras in a first-order
way. To this end, we first define precisely what we mean by the natural quotient of a
complete proper filter algebraB.
Definition 4.5 For any complete proper filter algebraB = 〈B,F〉, define its natural
quotient B/F as the tuple 〈B/F,piB(z),piB(g)〉, where piB is the quotient map from
B to B/F . We may drop the subscript of piB when its context is clear.
When viewed as a first-order structure, natural quotients of complete proper filter
algebras are in the type of Boolean algebras augmented with two constants. Hence
we define the following first-order language.
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Definition 4.6 LetFOL be the first-order language defined as below.
Terms : t ::= p | > | ¬t | (t ∧ t) where p ∈ Prop,
FOL : ϕ ::= (t = t ′) | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ∀pϕ where t, t ′ ∈ Terms.
Let FOL zg be the first-order language extending FOL by adding z and g as two
constants.
Note that here we are intentionally reusing the symbols inLΠ, so that the translation
betweenFOL zg and LBΠzg can be defined more directly. Note also that because
we use the same symbols for meet in terms and conjunction in formulas, we need to
bracket atomic formulas to avoid ambiguity. Now we define the standard first-order
semantics forFOL zg.
Definition 4.7 For any triple 〈B,z,g〉 where B is a Boolean algebra and z,g ∈ B, a
variable assignment θ : Prop→ B can be extended uniquely to θ˜ on the terms of
FOL zg by the following inductive clauses:
θ˜(p) = θ(p), θ˜(g) = g, θ˜(z) = z, θ˜(>) =>,
θ˜(¬t) = ¬Bθ˜(t), θ˜((t ∧ s)) = θ˜(t)∧B θ˜(s).
Then the semantics ofFOL zg is defined by
〈B,z,g〉,θ  (t = s) ⇐⇒ θ˜(t) = θ˜(s)
〈B,z,g〉,θ  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ 〈B,z,g〉,θ 6 ϕ
〈B,z,g〉,θ  (ϕ ∧ψ)⇐⇒ 〈B,z,g〉,θ  ϕ and 〈B,z,g〉,θ  ψ
〈B,z,g〉,θ  ∀pϕ ⇐⇒ 〈B,z,g〉,θ [a/p]  ϕ for all a ∈ B.
Syntactically, LBΠzg andFOL zg are almost identical. This can be seen from
how simply the translations between them can be defined.
Definition 4.8 Let T be the function from LBΠzg to FOL zg such that T (ϕ)
is the result of replacing all occurrences in ϕ of formulas of the form Bψ where
ψ ∈LBoolzg by (ψ =>).
Let T ′ be the function from FOL zg to LBΠzg such that T ′(ϕ) is the result
of replacing all atomic formulas (s = t) by B(s↔ t).
For example, recall the sentence ∃p(¬Bp∧¬B¬p) we used in Proposition 4.1 where
we showed that lower MacNeille completion does not preserve its semantic value. It
is not hard to see that T (∃p(¬Bp∧¬B¬p)) = ∃p(¬(p = >)∧¬(¬p = >)). Then
T (∃p(¬Bp∧¬B¬p)) is false on a 〈B,z,g〉 iff B is the 2-element Boolean algebra.
This matches our observation there that ∃p(¬Bp∧¬B¬p) is false (evaluates to ⊥)
on a complete proper filter algebra B = 〈B,F〉 iff the filter F is an ultrafilter, or
equivalently iff the quotient B/F is the 2-element Boolean algebra.
To make the intuition thatLBΠzg talks about natural quotients in the first-order
way precise, we use the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.1 For any ϕ ∈LBΠzg, any complete proper filter algebra B = 〈B,F〉,
and any valuation θ on B, θ˜(ϕ) is either > or ⊥, and θ˜(ϕ) = > if and only if
〈B/F,pi(z),pi(g)〉,pi ◦ θ  T (ϕ). As a corollary, when ϕ is a sentence, B  ϕ iff
B/FB T (ϕ).
Proof To avoid clutter, we omit the pair of parentheses immediately after pi and also
the circle for composing pi with θ . Hence pi p = pi(p) and piθ(p) = pi(θ(p)) = (pi ◦
θ)(p). Now obviously we need an induction onLBΠzg.
For any ψ ∈LBoolzg, a simple induction shows that piθ˜(ψ) = piθ(ψ), since pi
is a quotient map and hence a homomorphism. By our algebraic semantics defined
in Definition 2.5, θ˜(Bψ) is either >B or ⊥B according to whether θ˜(ψ) is in the
filter F or not. Also, since F = pi−1(>B/F) by the definition of pi in Definition 4.5,
piθ˜(ψ) =>B/F if and only if θ˜(ψ) ∈ F . Then
θ˜(Bψ) =>B ⇐⇒ θ˜(ψ) ∈ F ⇐⇒ piθ˜(ψ) =>B/F ⇐⇒ piθ(ψ) =>B/F
⇐⇒ 〈B/F,piz,pig〉,piθ  ψ =>
⇐⇒ 〈B/F,piz,pig〉,piθ T (Bψ).
For formulas inLBΠzg of the form¬ϕ where ϕ ∈LBΠzg, note first thatT (¬ϕ)=
¬T (ϕ). Also, θ˜(¬ϕ) must be either >B or ⊥B, given the induction hypothesis that
θ˜(ϕ) is either >B or ⊥B. Then, with the induction hypothesis that θ˜(ϕ) = >B iff
〈B/F,pig,piz〉 T (ϕ), we have
θ˜(¬ϕ) =>B ⇐⇒ θ˜(ϕ) =⊥B ⇐⇒ θ˜(ϕ) 6=>B
⇐⇒ 〈B/F,pig,piz〉 6T (ϕ)
⇐⇒ 〈B/F,pig,piz〉  ¬T (ϕ)
⇐⇒ 〈B/F,pig,piz〉 T (¬ϕ).
For formulas inLBΠzg of the form ϕ1∧ϕ2, the situation is completely similar. We
only need to do more replacements of equivalent claims coming from the induction
hypothesis in this case.
Now consider ∀qϕ . Note first that for all a ∈ B, by induction hypothesis we know
that θ˜ [a/q](ϕ) is either >B or ⊥B, since the proof works for all valuations. Then,
θ˜(∀qϕ) = ∧{θ˜ [a/q](ϕ)} must be either >B or ⊥B. Moreover, being a meet of el-
ements that are either >B or ⊥B, it is >B iff for all a ∈ B, θ˜ [a/q](ϕ) = >B, which,
using induction hypothesis, is equivalent to
for all a ∈ B,〈B/F,pig,piz〉,pi ◦ (θ [a/q]) T (ϕ). (1)
On the other hand, according to the semantics, 〈B/F,pig,piz〉,piθ T (∀qϕ) iff
for all a ∈ B/F,〈B/F,pig,piz〉,(pi ◦θ)[a/q] T (ϕ). (2)
Hence, all we need to show now is that (1) and (2) are equivalent. Too see that they
are equivalent, note that for any a ∈ B, pi ◦ (θ [a/q]) is the same function as (pi ◦
θ)[pi(a)/q]. Then, given that pi is surjective, we are done. uunionsq
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4.2 Logics in auxiliary languages and completeness proof
In the last subsection, we introduced a number of fragments of LΠzg, including
LBΠzg, which can be translated to the first-order language FOL zg in a semanti-
cally meaningful way: a formula ϕ ∈LBΠzg evaluates to > in a complete proper
filter algebra B iff its translation T (ϕ) is true on the natural quotient B/FB . From
this we see that semantically, LBΠzg is talking about the natural quotients of com-
plete proper filter algebras in a first-order way.
In this subsection, we move to the logical side of this translation. We will first
augment KD4∀5Π with two definitional axioms for the two new constants z and g
and obtain KD4∀5Πzg. Then we provide a first-order logic FOLzg that is sound and
complete with respect to a class of Boolean algebras with two extra named elements,
which we call the class of zg-algebras. This class of zg-algebras is bigger than the
class of natural quotients of complete proper filter algebras. However, we can show in
a later section that the first-order logics of them are the same. In this section, the main
task is to show that reasoning in FOLzg can be carried out in KD4∀5Πzg by the reverse
translation T ′. Then, assuming that we can separate the translatable part LBΠzg
and the non-translatable part and that FOLzg is not only the first-order logic of zg-
algebras but also the first-order logic of the class of natural quotients of complete
proper filter algebras, we show in this section that KD4∀5Πzg is complete with respect
to all complete proper filter algebras. Given that KD4∀5Πzg is a definitional extension
of KD4∀5Π, the completeness of KD4∀5Π follows.
To start, we define the system KD4∀5Πzg.
Definition 4.9 Define logic KD4∀5Πzg by extending KD4∀5Π with the following two
axioms for z and g:
z : z↔∀p(Bp→ p),
g : g↔ (∀p(Bp→ p)∧∃p(p∧at(p))).
The new axioms state the semantic definition of z and g, as shown in Proposition
4.2. Moreover, the right-hand side of these two axioms are inLΠ. Hence KD4∀5Πzg
is a conservative extension of KD4∀5Π, and henceforth we only need to prove that
KD4∀5Πzg is the complete logic of complete proper filter algebras inLΠzg accord-
ing to the semantics defined in Definition 4.3.
Notation 1 In this and the next subsection, we will state many provability claims in
the system KD4∀5Πzg. We write ` ϕ for ϕ being provable in KD4∀5Πzg and write
ϕ a` ψ for ` ϕ ↔ ψ . We treat a` as a kind of equality between formulas so that in
notation we chain them and use substitutions. We can do this because KD4∀5Πzg is a
normal Π-logic, and thus a` is a congruence relation with respect to all connectives
and quantifiers.
Now we prove two lemmas that will be very useful. The first shows the impor-
tance of having 4∀, and the second shows the use of the constant z. To state the first
lemma, we call a formula ϕ ∈LΠzg fully modalized when every propositional let-
ter (those in Prop∪ {>,z,g}) is under the scope of some B. It is not hard to see
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that the fully modalized formulas in LΠzg can be characterized by the grammar
ϕ ::= Bψ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ∀pϕ , where ψ ∈LΠzg.
Lemma 4.2 For every fully modalized formula ϕ ∈LΠzg, ϕ a` Bϕ a` B̂ϕ .
Proof First we show ϕ a` Bϕ by induction.
– The case where ϕ = Bψ is trivial by KD45 since we are just showing that Bψ a`
BBψ .
– Suppose ϕ = ψ1∧ψ2 where ψ1 and ψ are fully modalized. Then ψ1 a` Bψ1 and
ψ2 a` Bψ2. Then ψ1∧ψ2 a` Bψ1∧Bψ2 a` B(ψ1∧ψ2).
– Suppose ϕ = ¬ψ where ψ is fully modalized, and hence ψ a` Bψ . Then again
by KD45, we have a chain of provable equivalences: ¬ψ a` ¬Bψ a` B¬Bψ a`
B¬ψ . The last equivalence can be obtained by simply replacing Bψ by ψ . Since
KD4∀5Πzg is normal, we can certainly do such replacements.
– Suppose ϕ = ∀pψ where ψ is fully modalized and thus ψ a` Bψ . Then ∀pψ a`
∀pBψ . By 4∀, ∀pψ a` B∀pBψ . Then we can replace Bψ by ψ again, and hence
∀pψ a` B∀pϕ .
Then for any fully modalized formula ϕ , noting that we just proved that ϕ a` Bϕ ,
ϕ a` Bϕ a` B̂Bϕ a` B̂ϕ . uunionsq
Lemma 4.3 For every ϕ,ψ ∈LΠzg, the following are theorems of KD4∀5Πzg:
[z](ϕ → ψ)→ ([z]ϕ → [z]ψ),
z→ ([z]ϕ → ϕ),
[z]ϕ → [z][z]ϕ,
〈z〉ϕ → [z]〈z〉ϕ.
Moreover, if ` z→ ϕ , then ` z→ [z]ϕ . This means that, assuming z, [z] is an S5
modality.
Proof The first, third, and last formulas are easy to derive in KD4∀5Πzg. For the
second, recall that by the axiom z, ` z↔ ∀p(Bp→ p). Hence, assuming z, we can
deduce B(z→ ϕ)→ (z→ ϕ). But we can also derive (z→ ϕ)→ ϕ as we have z in
hand. So we derive B(z→ ϕ)→ ϕ and thus [z]ϕ → ϕ .
Finally, for the necessitation-like implication, suppose that ` z→ ϕ . Then by
necessitation, B(z→ ϕ) is provable, but this is just [z]ϕ . So certainly z→ [z]ϕ is
provable. uunionsq
Moving to the FOL zg side, what we need is a first-order logic that is weak
enough to be embedded using T ′ in KD4∀5Πzg, yet strong enough to include all
validities of the natural quotients of complete proper filter algebras. It turns out that
this logic is the logic of the following very general class of Boolean algebras with
two named elements.
Definition 4.10 A zg-algebra A is a tuple 〈A0,zA,gA〉 such that A0 is a non-trivial
Boolean algebra and zA,gA ∈ A0, such that zAgA is atomic (it is the join of atoms
below it), zAgA is atomless (there is no atom below it), and gA ≤ zA.
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Note that according to the definition, for any zg-algebra A, gA is precisely the join
of the atoms below zA. Hence zg-algebras can alternatively be defined as Boolean
algebras with an element z such that the join of the atoms below it exists and is
denoted by g. It is not too hard to observe that all natural quotients of complete proper
filter algebras are zg-algebras. On the other hand, there are certainly zg-algebras that
are not isomorphic to the natural quotients of any complete proper filter algebra. An
obvious way to construct such zg-algebras is to take zg-algebras whose restriction
to z is not complete. By our definition, this is totally admissable for being a zg-
algebra: it is enough if the join of atoms below z exists. However, for any zg-algebra
A =B/FB whereB is some complete proper filter algebra, A|zA must be a complete
Boolean algebra since firstB is complete and second A|zA is isomorphic toB|zB . We
will show that it is not a problem that zg-algebras forms a wider class than the class
of natural quotients of complete proper filter algebras. The motivation of having a
wider class is that this class of zg-algebras is first-order definable, and thus we get a
complete first-order logic for free. The logic is presented below, and we omit the easy
soundness and completeness proof since the class of zg-algebras is obviously defined
by the non-logical axioms.
Proposition 4.3 The validities of all zg-algebras in the language of FOL zg under
the semantics in Definition 4.7 is axiomatized by the logic FOLzg defined by the ax-
iom schemas below and the usual modus ponens and universalization rule. In the
group of logical axioms, ϕ,ψ are arbitrary formulas in FOL zg, t is an arbitrary
term, and p,q,r are arbitrary variables in Prop. In the second group of non-logical
axioms, p,q,r are three specific and distinct variables in Prop while s, t still stand for
arbitrary terms.
Logical axioms
All instances of propositional tautology schemas inFOL zg
∀p(ϕ → ψ)→ (∀pϕ →∀pψ)
∀pϕ → ϕ[t/p] when t is substitutable for p in ϕ
ϕ →∀pϕ when p is not free in ϕ
(p = p)∧ ((p = q)→ (q = p))
((p = q)∧ (q = r))→ (p = r)
(p = q)→ ((¬p = ¬q))
(p = q)→ ((r∧ p = r∧q)∧ (p∧ r = q∧ r))
Non-logical axioms
¬(>6⊥) (3)
(s = t) when s↔ t is a tautology (4)
(g 6 z) (5)
∀p(((p6 zg)∧ (p 6=⊥))→∃q((q6 p)∧ (q 6=⊥)∧∀r((q6 r)∨ (q6 r)))) (6)
∀p(((p6 zg)∧ (p 6=⊥))→∃q((q6 p)∧ (pq 6=⊥)∧ (pq 6=⊥))) (7)
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Note that we are not using the usual Leibniz’s law in this axiomatization. Instead, we
have a group of axioms saying that the equality relation is a congruence relation. The
usual Leibniz’s law can be derived from them together with other axioms and rules.
This is mainly for the ease of showing that the translations preserve theoremhood,
since KD4∀5Πzg does not have Leibniz’s law as one of its axioms.
In the non-logical axioms above and also for the rest of the paper, we use the
following abbreviations inFOL zg: (s6 t) := ((s→ t) =>) and (s 6= t) :=¬(s= t).
Intuitively the abbreviation (s6 t) says that s is below t in the Boolean lattice order.
Then the two axioms intuitively say that zg is atomic and zg is atomless respectively.
Obviously then the non-logical axioms define zg-algebras.
That FOLzg is weak enough to be embedded into KD4∀5Πzg is shown by the
following three lemmas.
Lemma 4.4 For any ϕ ∈LBΠzg, ϕ ↔ T ′(T (ϕ)) is provable in KD4∀5Πzg. For
any ϕ ∈FOL zg, ϕ ↔T (T ′(ϕ)) is provable in FOLzg
Proof T ′(T (ϕ)) turns every Bβ in ϕ first to β = > and then to B(β ↔ >). But
Bβ ↔ B(β ↔>) is in KD4∀5Πzg. Similarly, T (T ′(ϕ)) turns the s = t in ϕ first to
B(s↔ t) and then to ((s↔ t) =>). But (s = t)↔ ((s↔ t) =>) is in FOLzg. uunionsq
Lemma 4.5 For any axiom ϕ in Proposition 4.3 defining FOL zg, T ′(ϕ) is prov-
able in KD4∀5Πzg.
Proof The translations of the logical axioms are easily provable in KD4∀5Πzg since
it is a normal Π-logic and, in particular it can do Boolean reasoning inside B. For
the rest, the only non-trivial axioms to be dealt with are (6) and (7). To derive the
translation of (6) in KD4∀5Πzg, we now work in LΠzg. Let us first assume pzg in
system. Then we have p∧∀p(Bp→ p)∧∃p(p∧at(p)). Instantiating ∃p(p∧at(p))
using x, we have x∧at(x) that just abbreviates
x∧〈z〉x∧∀r([z](x→ r)∨ [z](x→¬r)).
Instantiating ∀r([z](x→ r)∨ [z](x→¬r)) using p, we have [z](x→ p)∨ [z](x→¬p).
But assuming, at this point, the latter disjunct leads to contradiction since we have
assumed z, which, according to Lemma 4.3, allows us to remove [z] and obtain x→
¬p, contradicting the previously assumed pzg and x∧ at(x). Hence, we reject the
second disjunct and derive [z](x→ p). Summing everything, we now have:
[z](x→ p)∧〈z〉x∧∀r([z](x→ r)∨ [z](x→¬r)).
Writing this without any abbreviation and using ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → ϕ3) being provably
equivalent to (ϕ1∧ϕ2)→ ϕ3, we then have
B((z∧ x)→ p)∧ B̂(z∧ x)∧∀r(B((z∧ x)→ r)∨B((z∧ x)→¬r)).
Then we can existentially quantify back to obtain
ϕ(p) := ∃q(B(q→ p)∧ B̂q∧∀r(B(q→ r)∨B(q→¬r))),
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as z∧ x is a witness. The above process shows that ` pzg→ ϕ(p).
Now assume B(p→ zg)∧ B̂p in system. Then clearly we can deduce B̂(pzg).
Since we have just shown that ` pzg→ ϕ(p), we also obtain B(pzg→ ϕ(p)). Thus
B̂(pzg) → B̂(ϕ(p)) is provable. But ϕ(p) is fully modalized. So by Lemma 4.2,
B̂(ϕ(p))a`ϕ(p). This means that (B(p→ zg)∧B̂p)→ϕ(p) is provable, and hence,
after universalization, ` ∀p((B(p→ zg)∧ B̂p)→ ϕ(p)).
Note that for any s, t ∈LBoolzg, T (B(s→ t)) = (s 6 t) and T (B̂s) = (¬s 6=
⊥). The latter is easily seen to be provably equivalent to (s 6= >) in FOLzg. Thus,
T (∀p((B(p→ zg)∧B̂p)→ ϕ(p))) is obviously provably equivalent to (6) in FOLzg.
By Lemma 4.4, we are done in this case.
The translation of (7) can be derived in KD4∀5Πzg similarly. The key again is that
once we assume z, [z] is an S5 modality. uunionsq
Lemma 4.6 For any ϕ ∈ FOLzg, T ′(ϕ) ∈ KD4∀5Πzg.
Proof We show that for any derivation 〈ϕ1,ϕ2, · · · ,ϕn〉 of FOLzg, T ′(ϕi) is a theo-
rem of KD4∀5Πzg for all i from 1 to n by induction. For any i, if ϕi is an axiom in
FOLzg, then by the previous lemma, T ′(ϕ) ∈ KD4∀5Πzg. If ϕi is obtained by either
modus ponens or universalization, notice that the same rule applies to the formulas
after translation as the translation does not change the sentential form or the variables
used. So T ′(ϕi) can also be obtained from the rules. uunionsq
Now we can show the completeness of KD4∀5Πzg from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.7 Any sentence in LΠzg is equivalent in KD4∀5Πzg to a sentence in the
following form:
(z∧α)∨ (zg∧β )∨ (zg∧ γ),
where α,β ,γ are all sentences inLBΠzg.
Lemma 4.8 For any zg-algebra A, there is a complete proper filter algebra B such
thatB/FB is elementarily equivalent to A (satisfying the same formulas inFOL zg).
Moreover, zB is not ⊥B , zBgB is ⊥B if and only if zAgA is ⊥A, and zBgB is ⊥B
if and only if zAgA is ⊥A.
Theorem 4.2 Any sentence inLΠzg that is valid on all complete proper filter alge-
bras is also in KD4∀5Πzg.
Proof By Lemma 4.7, we can assume that we are dealing with a sentence ϕ =
(z∧α)∨ (zg∧β )∨ (zg∧ γ) where α,β ,γ are all sentences in LBΠzg. To proceed,
assume that ϕ is valid on all complete proper filter algebras.
By Lemma 4.1, for any complete proper filter algebraB and any valuation θ on
B, θ˜(α), θ˜(β ), θ˜(γ) are either > or ⊥. Also, z,zg, and zg disjointly decompose B.
This means that once θ˜(z) 6= ⊥, θ˜(α) must be > since otherwise θ˜(ϕ) will lose a
non-trivial θ˜(z) and be strictly below >. Similarly, θ˜(zg) 6= ⊥ implies θ˜(β ) = >,
and θ˜(zg) 6=⊥ implies θ˜(γ) =>.
Focus on α first. Now we know that α is valid on all complete proper filter algebra
B where zB 6= ⊥ since z always evaluates to zB . Then for any zg-algebra A, A 
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T (α) since by Lemma 4.8, for any zg-algebra A there is a complete proper filter
algebra B with zB 6= ⊥ such that B/FB is elementarily equivalent to A, and by
Lemma 4.1, B/FB  T (α) iff B  α . Now that T (α) is valid on all zg-algebras,
by Proposition 4.3, T (α) ∈FOL zg. By Lemma 4.6 and 4.4, then, ` α , and thus
` z→ α .
The method applies to the cases with β and γ too. Take β as an example. Now
β must be valid on all complete proper filter algebra B where zBgB is non-trivial.
If T (β ) is refutable by some zg-algebra A with zAgA non-trivial, then β will also
be refutable by some complete proper filter algebra B with zBgB non-trivial, using
lemma 4.8 and 4.1. This means thatT (β ) is valid on any zg-algebra A with zAgA non-
trivial. In other words, ¬(zg =⊥)→T (β ) is valid and hence provable inFOL zg.
Translating back toLΠzg, ` B̂(zg)→ β . But ` zg→ B̂(zg) since z a` ∀p(p→ B̂p),
and then we can instantiate this with zg. So ` zg→ β . In the same fashion, it can be
shown that ` zg→ γ .
Taking stock, we have shown that ` (z→ α), ` (zg→ β ), and ` (zg→ γ). But
obviously ` z∨ zg∨ zg since trivially ` g→ z. Some basic Boolean manipulation
then shows us that ` (z∧α)∨ (zg∧β )∨ (zg∧ γ). uunionsq
Theorem 4.1 follows since KD4∀5Πzg is a conservative extension of KD4∀5Π, and a
formula is valid if and only if its universal closure, which is a sentence, is valid.
4.3 Syntactical Reduction
In this section, we prove Lemma 4.7. The main idea is relativizing formulas by zg,zg,
and z. We also use ideas from the quantifier elimination for S5Π. See the appendix
of [32] and the original [19] for more about the quantifier elimination for S5Π.
An important addition to the S5Π case is the following lemma, where the intuition
is that if ¬B̂b is true, then b is unimportant and does not affect the semantic value of
ϕ(p) where ϕ ∈LBΠzg, when we replace p by either p∨b or p∧¬b.
Lemma 4.9 For any formula ϕ(p) ∈LBΠzg where p is free and any propositional
variable b not occuring in ϕ , the following are provable in KD4∀5Πzg:
B¬b→ (ϕ(p)↔ ϕ(p∨b)), B¬b→ (ϕ(p)↔ ϕ(p∧¬b)).
Proof We only show the p∨ b case here. The other case can be shown similarly.
First, a simple induction shows that for any Boolean formula β (p), (β (p)∨ b) a`
(β (p∨b)∨b). The only non-trivial case is negation. If (β (p)∨b) a` (β (p∨b)∨b),
then ¬(β (p)∨ b) a` ¬(β (p∨ b)∨ b). Pushing ¬ inside, (¬β (p)∧¬b) a` (¬β (p∨
b)∧¬b). Joining a b on both side and performing some Boolean manipulation, we
see that (¬β (p)∨b) a` (¬β (p∨b)∨b).
Using the normality of B, it is not hard to see that ` B¬b→ (Bϕ ↔ B(ϕ ∨ b)):
assuming B¬b, B(ϕ ∨ b) implies B((ϕ ∨ b)∧¬b), which then implies B(ϕ ∧¬b)
and hence also Bϕ . The other direction is trivial. Applying this to the case of ϕ being
β (p), we see then that `B¬b→ (Bβ (p)↔B(β (p)∨b)). Using the claim we proved
in the last paragraph, `B¬b→ (Bβ (p)↔Bβ (p∨b)). This forms the basis of a trivial
induction on the formulas inLBΠzg. uunionsq
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Since our strategy is to relativize by zg, zg, and z, we first introduce the necessary
definitions and lemmas required for separating the zg and zg part. Then we move to
the necessary preparation for separating the z part. Then we show a simple lemma on
when we can push ∃p over conjunctions. After that, we combine everything together.
For the zg and zg part, we need the following abbreviations:
Miϕ := ∃p1 · · · pi
( ∧
1≤i< j≤n
[z](pi→¬p j)∧
∧
1≤i≤n
at(pi)∧
∧
1≤i≤n
[z](pi→ ϕ)
)
(for i≥ 1) ,
M0ϕ :=>, Qiϕ := Miϕ ∧¬Mi+1ϕ (for i ∈ N), Nϕ := 〈z〉(g∧ϕ).
As usual, the auxiliary variables are chosen to be distinct and unused in ϕ . Here
Mi,Qi, and N come from the quantifier elimination proof of [19], which requires
the modality to be S5. But by Lemma 4.3, the modality [z] used here is really S5
if z is also present. Even if z is not assumed, KD4∀5Πzg still proves many intuitive
principles. We summarize the results in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.10 KD4∀5Πzg proves all instances of the following schemas. In the last
group, q is required to be not free in ϕ and±q can be either q or ¬q. Moreover, when
±q is taken to be q, m in the first four formulas is not 0, and when ±q is taken to be
¬q, n is not 0.
〈z〉(g∧ϕ)↔M1ϕ Miϕ ↔Mi(g∧ϕ) Qiϕ ↔ Qi(g∧ϕ)
∃q[Qm(ϕ ∧q)∧Qn(ϕ ∧q)]↔ Qm+nϕ ∃q[N(ϕ ∧q)∧N(ϕ ∧q)]↔ Nϕ
∃q[Qm(ϕ ∧q)∧Mn(ϕ ∧q)]↔Mm+nϕ ∃q[N(ϕ ∧q)∧¬N(ϕ ∧q)]↔ Nϕ
∃q[Mm(ϕ ∧q)∧Qn(ϕ ∧q)]↔Mm+nϕ ∃q[¬N(ϕ ∧q)∧N(ϕ ∧q)]↔ Nϕ
∃q[Mm(ϕ ∧q)∧Mn(ϕ ∧q)]↔Mm+nϕ ∃q[¬N(ϕ ∧q)∧¬N(ϕ ∧q)]↔¬Nϕ
n∨
i=0
(Mi(ϕ ∧ψ)∧Mn−i(ϕ ∧ψ))↔Mnϕ ((N(ϕ ∧ψ)∨ (N(ϕ ∧ψ)))↔ Nϕ
n∨
i=0
(Qi(ϕ ∧ψ)∧Qn−i(ϕ ∧ψ))↔ Qnϕ ((¬N(ϕ ∧ψ)∧¬(N(ϕ ∧ψ)))↔¬Nϕ
∃q[zg∧ϕ ∧±q∧Qm(ϕ ∧q)∧Qn(ϕ ∧q)]↔ (zg∧ϕ ∧Qm+nϕ)
∃q[zg∧ϕ ∧±q∧Mm(ϕ ∧q)∧Qn(ϕ ∧q)]↔ (zg∧ϕ ∧Mm+nϕ)
∃q[zg∧ϕ ∧±q∧Qm(ϕ ∧q)∧Mn(ϕ ∧q)]↔ (zg∧ϕ ∧Mm+nϕ)
∃q[zg∧ϕ ∧±q∧Mm(ϕ ∧q)∧Mn(ϕ ∧q)]↔ (zg∧ϕ ∧Mm+nϕ)
∃q[zg∧ϕ ∧±q∧N(ϕ ∧q)∧N(ϕ ∧q)]↔ (zg∧ϕ ∧Nϕ)
∃q[zg∧ϕ ∧±q∧¬N(ϕ ∧q)∧N(ϕ ∧q)]↔ (zg∧ϕ ∧Nϕ)
∃q[zg∧ϕ ∧±q∧N(ϕ ∧q)∧¬N(ϕ ∧q)]↔ (zg∧ϕ ∧Nϕ)
∃q[zg∧ϕ ∧±q∧¬N(ϕ ∧q)∧¬N(ϕ ∧q)]↔ (zg∧ϕ ∧¬Nϕ)
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Proof Syntactical proofs of them are not interesting, and here we only briefly explain
why they are valid, from which syntactical proofs can be extracted straightforwardly.
Using Proposition 4.2, Miϕ says that z∧ϕ contains at least i atoms. More precisely,
for any complete proper filter algebra B and valuation θ on B, θ˜(Miϕ) = > if and
only if zB ∧ θ˜(ϕ) contains at least i atoms, and otherwise θ˜(Miϕ) = ⊥. Similarly,
Qiϕ says that z∧ ϕ contains exactly i atoms, and Nϕ says that z∧ ϕ contains an
atomless part.
Note that θ˜(g) = gB is the join of all atoms under zB and hence atomic. So if
gB∧zB∧ θ˜(ϕ) is non-trivial, then zB∧ θ˜(ϕ) must contain an atom, and the numbers
of atoms below zB ∧ θ˜(ϕ) and gB ∧ zB ∧ θ˜(ϕ) respectively are the same. These two
observations show the validity of the first group of three formulas.
The left six formulas in the second group are simply counting principles, and the
right six formulas state obvious properties of atomless elements. Hence they are all
valid. Note that they only consider the situation under z.
For the last group, note that by Boolean reasoning, (z∧α)↔ (z∧ β ) a` z→
(α ↔ β ). By Proposition 4.3, to prove the last group of formulas in KD4∀5Πzg, we
only need to translate their proofs in S5Π to proofs in KD4∀5Πzg by replacing the S5
modality  by [z]. uunionsq
For the z part, the only extra definition we need is the following.
Definition 4.11 Define the following abbreviations:
〈z¯〉ϕ := B̂(z∧ϕ), [z]ϕ := B(z→ ϕ).
Then define the following restricted version ofLBΠzg:
L [z]Π : ϕ ::= [z]t | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ∀pϕ
where t ∈LBool, p ∈ Prop.
Now we introduce the concept of a propositional variable being restricted. This
helps us to distribute existential quantifiers over conjunctions in certain cases.
Definition 4.12 We say that p is restricted by a formula µ in ϕ just in case µ is
substitutable for p in ϕ and ` ∀p(ϕ(p)↔ ϕ(p∧µ)).
Lemma 4.11 ∃p(ϕ ∧ψ) is provably equivalent to ∃pϕ ∧∃pψ , if there are formulas
µ,ν , such that
– p in ϕ is restricted by µ , p in ψ is restricted by ν , and
– ¬(µ ∧ν) is provable.
Proof One direction of the equivalence is trivial. For the other, the strategy is rela-
tivization. Suppose ∃pϕ(p)∧∃pψ(p) in system. Then we have ϕ(p1) and ψ(p2).
By the assumption that p in ϕ is restricted by µ and that p in ψ is restricted by
ν , we can derive ϕ(p1 ∧ µ) and ψ(p2 ∧ ν). Now we see that ¬(µ ∧ ν) is prov-
able. So, using Boolean reasoning and letting χ = (p1 ∧ µ)∨ (p2 ∧ ν), χ ∧ µ a`
p1 ∧ µ and χ ∧ ν a` p2 ∧ ν . Hence we now have a chain of provable equivalence:
ϕ(χ) a` ϕ(χ ∧µ) a` ϕ(p1∧µ) a` ϕ(p1). Similarly ψ(χ) a` ψ(p2). Thus χ wit-
ness ∃p(ϕ(p)∧ψ(p)). uunionsq
On the Logic of Belief and Propositional Quantification 35
Now we start to combine everything together. A few extra notations are used. We
fix an enumeration 〈pi〉i<|Prop| of Prop and write p or in general use vector notation
for a finite subset of Prop. Then for p = {pi1 , pi2 , . . . , pin} with i1 < i2 < · · · < in,
2p is the set of formulas in the form of ±pi1 ∧±pi2 ∧ ·· · ∧±pin . We call elements
in 2p cells. And as usual, a conjunction of no formulas is >, and a disjunction of no
formulas is ⊥.
Definition 4.13 A state description over p with degree l ∈ N is a conjunction of the
following components:
– (choice of zg) one of z,zg,zg,
– (propositional truth) one cell c ∈ 2p,
– (z part) oneL [z]Π formula δ whose free variables are all in p,
– (zg part) for each cell c ∈ 2p, a formula Mlc or Qic for some 0≤ i < l,
– (zg part) for each cell c ∈ 2p, a formula Nc or ¬Nc.
We call the first two parts the propositional part and the rest the modal part of a state
description. A partial state description over p of degree l is a formula missing one
or more components above. If the only missing part is the propositional part, we also
call it a modal state description.
Lemma 4.12 Every free variable in a z (respectively zg, zg) part is restricted by z
(respectively zg, zg).
Proof For the z part, note that in any formula ϕ ∈L [z]Π, every free variable appears
in a Boolean term which is then in a conjunction with z. We can distribute this z
into the Boolean term, assuming that Boolean term is already in negation normal
form. Then every free variable appears either in the form of z∧ p or z∧¬p. But
z∧ p a` z∧ (p∧ z) and z∧¬p a` z∧¬(p∧ z).
For the zg part, take Mic for some c ∈ 2p and p ∈ p for example. First note that
by definition of Mi, c in Mic appears in a Boolean term directly following [z]. So
using a similar proof as in the previous case, p in Mic is restricted to z. Then note
that in Lemma 4.10, Mic is provably equivalent to Mi(g∧ c). So obviously p in Mic
is restricted to g as well. Finally, it is not hard to see that in general if p in ϕ(p)
is restricted to both µ and ν , then it is also restricted to µ ∧ ν . Indeed, ϕ(p) will
first be equivalent to ϕ(p∧ µ) and then to ϕ((p∧ µ)∧ ν), but this is equivalent to
ϕ(p∧ (µ ∧ν)). Thus p in Mic is restricted to zg.
The case for the zg part is similar. uunionsq
Lemma 4.13 For every partial state description ϕ over p with degree l, and for every
finite set of variables p′ ⊇ p and every natural number l′ ≥ l, ϕ is provably equivalent
in KD4∀5Πzg to a disjunction of state descriptions over p′ with degree l′.
Proof Let ϕ , p, l, p′, and l′ be arbitrarily given as above. Without loss of generality,
we assume that p′ = p∪{p′} since we can repeat the following process many times
if necessary. Now, let ψ be the conjunction of the following ψ1,ψ2,ψ3,ψ4, and ψ5:
– If ϕ has a choice of zg, let ψ1 be this choice. Otherwise let ψ1 be z∨ zg∨ zg.
– If ϕ has a propositional truth c ∈ 2p, let ψ2 be (c∧ p′)∨ (c∧ p′). Otherwise, let
ψ2 be
∨
2p
′
.
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– If ϕ has a z part, let ψ3 be the z part. Otherwise, let ψ3 be [z]>.
– If ϕ has no zg part, let ψ4 be the disjunctive normal form of
∧
c∈2p′ (Q0c∨Q1c∨·· ·∨Ql′−1c∨Ml′c) with Qic and Ml′c seen as atomic formulas.
Otherwise, say ϕ has a zg part δzg =
∧
c∈2p Xcc with Xc being either Qi for some
i < l or Ml . If p′ is just p (that is, p′ ∈ p), let ψ4 be δzg. If p′ 6∈ p, construct ψ4
by first replacing each Mlc in δzg with
∨l
i=0(Mi(cp
′)∧Ml−i(cp′)) and each Q jc
with
∨ j
i=0(Qi(cp
′)∧Q j−i(cp′)). Then replace each Mic with c now being in 2p′
and with i < l′ by (Qic∨Qi+1c∨·· ·∨Ql′−1c∨Ml′c). Finally, take its disjunctive
normal form with Qic and Ml′c for all c ∈ 2p′ seen as atomic formulas.
– If ϕ has no zg part, let ψ5 be the disjunctive normal form of
∧
c∈2p′ (Nc∨¬Nc)
with Nc and ¬Nc seen as atomic formulas.
Otherwise, say ϕ has a zg part δzg =
∧
c∈2p Xcc where Xc is either N or ¬N. If
p= p′ (that is, p′ ∈ p), let ψ5 be δzg. If not, let ψ5 be constructed by first replacing
each Nc in δzg by (N(cp′)∧N(cp′))∨ (N(cp′)∧¬N(cp′))∨ (¬N(cp′)∧N(cp′))
and replacing each ¬Nc in δzg by ¬N(cp′)∧¬N(cp′). Then take its disjunctive
normal form with Nc and ¬Nc as atomic formulas.
Now it should not be too hard to see that ψ is provably equivalent to ϕ as each of
ψi is provably equivalent to the respective part of ϕ if it exists, or to > otherwise.
In particular, to see that ψ4 a` δzg and ψ5 a` δzg, use Lemma 4.10. Then, let ϕ ′
be the result of distributing the outermost conjunction over ψ1 through ψ5 over the
disjunctions in them. Clearly ϕ ′ is now a disjunction of state descriptions over p′ with
degree l′, and ϕ ′ is provably equivalent to ϕ . uunionsq
Lemma 4.14 Any formula ϕ ∈LΠzg with p being its set of free variables is prov-
ably equivalent in KD4∀5Πzg to a disjunction of state descriptions over p.
Proof By induction. Since we are only after provable equivalence, we can pretend
that our language has ∨, B̂, and ∃ as primitives. For the base cases, note that:
– every propositional variable p in Prop is a partial state description in {p} with
degree 0;
– > is a partial state description in {} with degree 0;
– since z a` (zg∨ zg), z is equivalent to a disjunction of two partial state descrip-
tions over {} with degree 0;
– since ` g→ z and g a` zg, g is also provably equivalent to a disjunction of partial
state descriptions over {} with degree 0.
Hence we can apply the previous lemma to clear the base cases.
Now suppose ϕ = ϕ1∨ϕ2, and let p1 and p2 be the set of free variables in ϕ1 and
ϕ2, respectively. Then p = p1∪p2 is the set of free variables of ϕ . By the induction
hypothesis, there is a disjunction ψ1 of state descriptions over p1 with some degree l1
provably equivalent to ϕ1 and a disjunctionψ2 of state descriptions over p2 with some
degree l2 provably equivalent to ϕ2. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
l1 ≥ l2. Now we first use the previous Lemma 4.13 to turn ψ1 and ψ2 into disjunctions
of state descriptions over p with degree l1 and obtain α and β . Then α ∨ β is the
formula we need in this case.
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For the negation case, suppose ϕ = ¬ψ with p being the set of free variables in
ψ . Then p is also the set of free variables in ϕ . Using the induction hypothesis, let
α be a disjunction of state descriptions over p with some degree l that is provably
equivalent to ψ . Then using Lemma 4.13, let β be a disjunction of state descriptions
over p with degree l that is provably equivalent to >. Then let γ be the disjunction
of the state descriptions over p with degree l that are in β but not in α . Then γ is a
disjunction of state descriptions over p with degree l that is provably equivalent to ϕ .
Now suppose ϕ = B̂ψ with p being the set of free variables in ψ and hence also
ϕ . By the induction hypothesis, ψ is provably equivalent to a disjunction of state
descriptions
∨
i∈I ψi. Then B̂ψ a` B̂
∨
i∈I ψi a`
∨
i∈I B̂ψi. Hence, we only need to
show that for each state description ψi, B̂ψi is equivalent to a partial state description,
which can then be turned to a disjunction of state descriptions. Let ψi = b∧ c∧d so
that b ∈ {z,zg,zg},c ∈ 2p, and d is the modal part of ψi. By Lemma 4.2, ψi a`
(b∧ c∧Bd) since d is fully modalized. Then it is a standard exercise of modal logic
to show that B̂ψi a` B̂(b∧c)∧Bd, which is then provably equivalent to B̂(b∧c)∧d.
Now there are three cases:
– if b = z, then B̂(b∧ c) is just 〈z¯〉c. But then 〈z¯〉c∧d is a partial state description,
as 〈z¯〉c is aL [z]Π formula and can be included in the z part.
– if b = zg, then B̂(b∧c) a` 〈z〉(g∧c). But 〈z〉(g∧c) a`M1c, and M1c∧d can be
turned into a partial state description, as there is a Qic/Mlc formula in d, and M1c
can be merged in to that formula, resulting in ⊥ or the original d.
– if b = zg, then B̂(b∧ c) a` 〈z〉(g∧ c). But 〈z〉(g∧ c) a` Nc and hence can be
merged into d.
In sum, B̂ψi is provably equivalent to a partial state description missing a choice of a
zg part and a propositional truth part.
For ∃, like B̂, we only need to show that ∃qψi is provably equivalent to a partial
state description over p\{q} where ψi is a state description over p. The case where
q 6∈ p is trivial so we assume here that q ∈ p. Let ψi be b∧ c∧ δz ∧ δzg ∧ δzg, where
b ∈ {z,zg,zg}, c ∈ 2p, δz is the z part of ψi (aL [z]Π formula), δzg is the zg part, and
δzg is the zg part. As noted in Lemma 4.12, δz,δzg, and δzg are restricted by z, zg, and
zg respectively. Then by repeated use of Lemma 4.11, we have the following cases:
– If b = z, then ∃qψi a` ∃q(z∧ c∧δz)∧∃qδzg∧∃qδzg.
– If b = zg, then ∃qψi a` ∃qδz∧∃q(zg∧ c∧δzg)∧∃qδzg.
– If b = zg, then ∃qψi a` ∃qδz∧∃qδzg∧∃q(zg∧ c∧δzg).
Hence what remains to be shown is that in each of these three cases, the three con-
juncts on the right-hand side of the a` claim are provably equivalent to a z part, a zg
part, and a zg part, possibly with a corresponding choice of zg and a propositional
truth c, respectively.
First consider the two possibilities ∃qδz and ∃q(z∧ c∧δz). We need to show that
they are provably equivalent to some z part. Now ∃qδz is already a L [z]Π formula
and thus a z part, so there is nothing further to show. For ∃q(z∧ c∧ δz), depending
on whether q appears in c positively or negatively, we have two cases (the f below is
the result of excluding the literal of q in c).
38
– If q appears positively, we have ∃q(z∧ f ∧q∧δz). This is provably equivalent to
z∧ f ∧∃qδz. The direction from left to right is trivial. For the other direction, if
q is not free in δz, it is also trivial. So assume now that q is free in δz(q). First
instantiate ∃qδz(q) with a fresh a and obtain δz(a). Now recall that z a` ∃r(r∧
B¬r). Since we already have z, we can now instantiate with a fresh propositional
variable b and get b∧B¬b. By Lemma 4.9, ` δz(a)↔ δz(a∨b) (recall that δz(a)
is inLBΠzg), and hence we obtain δz(a∨b). But ` b→ (a∨b), so we also obtain
a∨ b. Then a∨ b witnesses ∃q(q∧ δz(q)). Summing up the process, we have
shown that ` (z∧∃qδz)→∃q(q∧δz). Then it is easy to see that ` (z∧ f ∧∃qδz)→
∃q(z∧ f ∧q∧δz) since q does not appear in z and f .
– ∃q(z∧ f ∧¬q∧ δz). This is very similar to the previous case. We only need to
prove the direction from z∧ f ∧∃δz to ∃q(z∧ f ∧¬q∧δz) and in fact only that `
(z∧∃qδz)→∃q(¬q∧δz). We can also assume that q is free in δz(q). Instantiating
∃qδz and z with fresh a and b, we get δz(a) and b∧B¬b. By Lemma 4.9, we get
δz(a∧¬b). Also, ` b→¬(a∧¬b). Hence a∧¬b witnesses ∃q(¬q∧δz(q)), and
we are done in this case.
So, the two formulas involving δz are indeed provably equivalent to formulas that can
serve as the z part of some state description over p\{q}.
For the cases involving δzg and δzg, note that both of them are conjunctions of
formulas that are restricted to one of c ∈ 2p. Considering this, we can push ∃q further
down, with results in the following cases where again f is the result of restricting c
to literals using only things in p\{q}:
– ∃q(Qi/Ml( f q)∧Q j/Ml( f q)),
– ∃q(zg∧ f ∧±q∧Qi/Ml( f q)∧Q j/Ml( f q)),
– ∃q(±N( f q)∧±N( f q)),
– ∃q(zg∧ f ∧±q∧±N( f q)∧±N( f q)).
They are all addressed in Lemma 4.10. uunionsq
Now Lemma 4.7 follows from the previous lemma. Too see this, observe first that
the modal parts of any state description areLBΠzg formulas. Further, when there is
no free variable, the propositional truth part will be > in any state description. So a
state description over {} can be seen as simply a conjunction of one of z,zg,zg, and a
LBΠzg formula. Then for any sentence ϕ inLΠ, since it has no free variable, it is
provably equivalent in KD4∀5Πzg to a disjunction
∨
i∈I(ai∧bi) such that for all i ∈ I,
ai ∈ {z,zg,zg} and bi ∈LBΠzg. But then we only need to extract the ai’s according
to what they are. Formally, letting Iz = {i ∈ I | ai = z}, Izg = {i ∈ I | ai = zg}, and
Izg = {i ∈ I | ai = zg}, ϕ a` (z∧∨i∈Iz bi)∨ (zg∧∨i∈Izg bi)∨ (zg∧∨i∈Izg bi). This
formula is in the required form in Lemma 4.7.
4.4 Quotients of complete Boolean algebras
In this subsection we prove Lemma 4.8. The main idea is to show that every Boolean
algebra is elementarily equivalent to a κ-field-of-sets for a large enough cardinal κ
to be speficied later and then invoke a theorem saying that every κ-field-of-sets can
On the Logic of Belief and Propositional Quantification 39
be realized as a quotient of a complete Boolean algebra for large enough κ . To show
that every Boolean algebra is elementarily equivalent to a κ-field-of-sets, we show
that every Tarski invariant, which fully describes the first-order properties of Boolean
algebras, is realized by a κ-field-of-sets.
First we define κ-regular subalgebras and κ-field-of-sets.
Definition 4.14 A Boolean algebra B is a κ-regular subalgebra of C if B is a subal-
gebra of C and for any X ⊆ B with |X |< κ , whenever ∧C X exists, it is also in B. We
write B4κ C for B being a κ-regular subalgebra of C.
we say an embedding f : B ↪→C is κ-regular if for every X ⊆ B such that |X |< κ ,
whenever
∧
C f [X ] exists,
∧
B X also exists and f (
∧
B X) =
∧
C f [X ]. Or equivalently,
f is κ-regular if the image of f is a κ-regular subalgebra of C. We write f : B ↪→κ C
when f is a κ-regular embedding from B to C and write B ↪→κ C when there is such
a κ-regular embedding.
Definition 4.15 A Boolean algebra B is a κ-field-of-sets if there is a set D such that
B ↪→κ℘(D). Here℘(D) is the powerset algebra of D.
Proposition 4.4 For any cardinal κ , the property of being a κ-field-of-sets is closed
taking κ-regular subalgebras and is closed under taking arbitrary direct product.
Proof First, clearly, if A ↪→κ B and B ↪→κ C, then A ↪→κ C. Hence if A 4κ B and
B ↪→κ℘(D), then A ↪→κ℘(D). Thus κ-field-of-sets is closed under taking κ-regular
subalgebras.
Now consider an indexed set {Bi}i∈I of κ-field-of-sets with fi : Bi ↪→κ℘(Di) for
each i ∈ I. Then it is not hard to see that Πi∈IBi ↪→κ Πi∈I℘(Di). This is because,
letting pii be the natural projection map from ΠiBi to Bi, for every X ⊆ ΠiBi, ∧X =
〈∧pii[X ]〉i∈I , if any side of this equation exists. In other words, meets can be computed
componentwisely. But Πi∈I℘(Di) is isomorphic to℘(
⋃
i∈I({i}×Di)). Hence Πi∈IBi
is also a κ-field-of-sets. uunionsq
Due to the fact that we need to deal with zg-algebras instead of just Boolean algebras,
sometimes we need to make sure that the cokernels of the quotient maps we use have
a trivial meet. We now introduce notations for this and prove two lemmas about it.
Definition 4.16 We say a surjective homomorphism f : A B is meet-trivial if its
cokernel f−1(>B) has a trivial meet:∧ f−1(>B) exists and is⊥A. We write f : A◦ B
when f : A B and f is meet-trivial, and we write A◦ B when there is a meet-trivial
surjective homomorphism from A to B. In the later case, we also say that B is a meet-
trivial homomorphic image of A.
Proposition 4.5 For any Boolean algebras A, B, and C, if f : A B and g : B◦C,
then (g◦ f ) : A◦C.
Proof Let f : A B and g : B◦C be given. To show that g◦ f : A◦C, by definition,
we only need to show that
∧
F =⊥A where F = (g◦ f )−1(>C). Suppose not and let
a be a non-trivial lower bound of F in A. Then first we can show that f (a) 6= ⊥B
since if otherwise f (a) = ⊥B, then f (¬a) = >B, meaning that g( f (¬a)) = >C and
that ¬a ∈ F , which obviously contradicts the assumption that a is below everything,
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in particular ¬a, in F and that a 6= ⊥A. Since f is a homomorphism, f (a) is a lower
bound of f [F ]. Then we only need to note that g−1(>C) = f [F ], and hence f (a) is a
non-trivial lower bound of g−1(>C), contradicting g : B◦C. uunionsq
Proposition 4.6 For any κ-field-of-sets B where κ is a regular cardinal, meaning
that the cofinality cf(κ) = κ , there is a κ-field-of-sets C such that C◦ B.
Proof Let κ and B be given as above. Then consider the following subset of Bκ =
Πi<κB:
C = { f ∈ Bκ | ∃α ∈ κ,∀β ∈ κ, if β ≥ α then f (β ) = f (α)}.
The set C colletcs what we may call the eventually constant elements in Bκ . For
every f ∈C, let lim f be the limit of f defined in the obvious way. Now we show that
C with operations inherited from Bκ is a κ-regular subalgebra of Bκ .
1. C is closed under negation. This is trivial.
2. C is closed under taking meets of sets of cardinality smaller than κ . Take any
{ fi}i∈I ⊆C with |I| < κ . Let αi for each i ∈ I be the smallest ordinal in κ such
that for any β such that κ > β ≥ αi, fi(β ) = fi(αi). Then let f =∧ fi in Bκ . Now
because cf(κ) = κ , α = supi∈I αi < κ . Thus for any β such that κ > β ≥ α and
any i ∈ I, fi(β ) = fi(αi) = fi(α). Hence for any κ > β ≥ α ,
f (β ) =
∧
i∈I
fi(β ) =
∧
i∈I
fi(α) = f (α).
Then we know that f ∈C.
This also shows that for any set { fi}i∈I ⊆C with |I|< κ , lim∧i∈I fi =∧i∈I lim fi.
Using Proposition 4.4, C is now also a κ-field-of-sets since C 4κ Bκ and B is a
κ-field-of-sets. Now consider the set F = { f ∈C | lim f =>B}. Observe that F is a
filter in C. Also,
∧
F =⊥C. To see this, consider the sequence 〈 fi〉i∈κ defined by
fi(α) =
{
⊥B α < i
>B α ≥ i.
Each fi is in F , yet the only f ∈ C that is below all the fi’s is the constantly 0B
function, which is ⊥C.
Now note that lim as a function from C to B is a surjective homomorphism and
lim−1(>B) = F . Hence lim : C◦ B. uunionsq
Now we start to show that for every non-trivial Boolean algebra A, there is a
(2ω0)+-field-of-sets B which is elementarily equivalent to A. To this end, we first
recall the Tarski invariants.
Definition 4.17 For any Boolean algebra B, call an element b ∈ B atomic if b is the
join of the atoms below it, and atomless if there is no atom below it. If an element is
the join of an atomic element and an atomless element, we call it separable. Denote
the set of separable element in B by S(B). It is easy to see that S(B) is an ideal, which
is generated by the atomic and atomless elements.
On the Logic of Belief and Propositional Quantification 41
Then for any non-trivial Boolean algebra B, we can define a sequence of Boolean
algebras:
B(0) = B,B(i+1) = B(i)/S(B(i)).
With the above sequence, define Inv(B) for every non-trivial Boolean algebra B as
follows:
m(B) =
{
k if B(k) is non-trivial and B(k+1) is trivial
∞ if for all k ∈ ω,B(k) is non-trivial.
n0(B) =
{
∞ if m(B) ∈ N and B(m(B)) has infinitely many atoms
l if m(B) ∈ N and B(m(B)) has l ∈ N many atoms.
n(B) =

0 if m(B) 6∈ N
n0(B) if m(B) ∈ N and B(m(B)) is atomic
−n0(B) if m(B) ∈ N and B(m(B)) is not atomic.
Inv(B) = 〈m(B),n(B)〉.
We also define Inv(B) = 〈−1,0〉 when B is trivial. Finally let Inv be the set of all
possible invariant, i.e., Inv= {Inv(B) | B a Boolean algebra}.
Proposition 4.7 For any two Boolean algebras A and B, they are elementarily equiv-
alent if and only if Inv(A) = Inv(B). In fact, for any two Boolean algebras with ex-
tra distinguished elements, 〈A,a1,a2, · · ·an〉, 〈B,b1,b2, · · ·bn〉, they are elementarily
equivalent in the first-order language of Boolean algebras extended with n constants
to be interpreted by the corresponding distinguished elements if and only if for each
f ∈ 2n, Inv(A| f [a]) = Inv(B| f [b]). Here for any f ∈ 2n, f [a] is defined as the element∧
i∈ f−1(1) ai∧
∧
i∈ f−1(0)¬ai and f [b] is defined similarly.
Proof See Chap.5.5 of [13]. uunionsq
Hence our goal now is to construct a (2ω0)+-field-of-sets B for each invariant
c ∈ Inv such that Inv(B) = c. To start, we need at least an atomic and an atomless
κ-field-of-sets. An atomic κ-field of sets can be easily found, such as the Boolean
algebra of two elements. Now we construct an atomless κ-field-of-sets.
Proposition 4.8 For each regular infinite cardinal κ , there exists an atomless κ-field-
of-sets L.
Proof We construct a κ-field-of-sets in the powerset algebra of {0,1}κ . For any f ,g∈
{0,1}κ and i ∈ κ , write f =i g when f ( j) = g( j) for all j < i. Also let [ f ]i be the
equivalence class that f is in under =i, i.e. {g ∈ {0,1}κ | g =i f}.
Then it is not hard to see that the set of all subsets of {0,1}κ that are closed under
=i for some i ∈ κ forms an atomless κ-field-of-sets under the inherited complemen-
tation and intersection.
– Both empty set and {0,1}κ are closed under =1.
– Clearly if X is closed under =i, then {0,1}κ \X is also closed under =i.
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– For any family of κ0 < κ many sets {Xi}i∈κ0 such that each Xi is closed under =λi
where λi ∈ κ , consider their intersection. Let µ = supi∈κ0 λi. By the regularity of
κ , µ ∈ κ , and obviously each Xi is also closed under =µ since =α refines =β if
α ≥ β . Then the intersection ⋂{Xi | i ∈ κ0} is also closed under =µ .
– For any non empty X ⊆ {0,1}κ that is closed under =λ , pick f ∈ X and then we
can easily split [ f ]λ ⊆ X into two non-empty parts: {g ∈ [ f ]λ | g(λ +1) = 0} and
{g ∈ [ f ]λ | g(λ +1) = 1}. Both parts are non-empty subsets of X and are closed
under =λ+1. So X is not an atom in the Boolean algebra we construct. uunionsq
Now fix κ as an infinite regular cardinal, 2 a two-element Boolean algebra, and
L the atomless κ-field-of-sets constructed above. The next step is to show that for
every κ-field-of-sets B, there is a U(B) which is also a κ-field-of-sets, and moreover
U(B)/S(U(B)) ∼= B. Since we are constructing a κ-field-of-sets that has B as a ho-
momorphic image with some requirement on the kernel of the homomorphism, the
construction here is very similar to the one we did in Proposition 4.6.
For a κ-field-of-sets B, we construct U(B) as follows. First, since B is a κ-field-of-
sets, without loss of generality, we can assume that B4κ℘(ρ) with ρ a large enough
cardinal. Then we have e : B ↪→κ (2× L)ρ where e is such that for all b ∈ B and
λ < ρ , e(b)(λ ) =>2×L if and only if λ ∈ b, and otherwise e(b)(λ ) =⊥2×L. In other
words, e(b) is the characteristic function of b using {⊥2×L,>2×L} instead of {0,1}
as the codomain. By Proposition 4.4, (2× L)ρ is a κ-field-of-sets. Now, as in the
proof of Proposition 4.6, we can now define the set of eventually constant functions
C = { f ∈ ((2×L)ρ)κ | ∃α < κ∀β < κ,β > α⇒ f (β ) = f (α)}. Then we know that
C 4κ ((2×L)ρ)κ and hence is a κ-field-of-sets, and in addition lim : C◦ (2×L)ρ .
However, since we need a κ-field-of-sets with B, not (2×L)ρ , as its homomorphic
image, we need to take a κ-regular subalgebra of C. Indeed, we only need to take
U(B) = lim−1(e[B]). Essentially, U(B) is the pullback of e and lim. This is illustrated
by the following commutative diagram:
B (2×L)ρ
U(B) C.
e
id
lim
Lemma 4.15 For any κ-field-of-sets B, U(B) as defined above is also a κ-field-of-
sets, and U(B)/S(U(B))∼= B.
Proof To show that U(B) is a κ-field-of-sets, it is enough to show that U(B) 4κ
((2×L)ρ)κ . That is, we only need to show that for all X ⊆U(B) such that |X | < κ ,∧
((2×L)ρ )κ X is also in U(B) (it always exists as ((2× L)ρ)κ is a κ-field-of-sets).
To show that
∧
((2×L)ρ )κ X ∈U(B), we only need to show that lim
∧
((2×L)ρ )κ X ∈ e[B].
Since κ is regular, lim
∧
((2×L)ρ )κ X =
∧
(2×L)ρ lim[X ]. Since X ⊆U(B), lim[X ]⊆ e[B].
Since |X |< κ , |lim[X ]|< κ . Then indeed ∧(2×L)ρ lim[X ] ∈ e[B] since e is a κ-regular
embedding, and hence e[B]4κ (2×L)ρ .
To show that U(B)/S(U(B)) ∼= B, it is enough to show that the kernel of lim,
lim−1(⊥(2×L)ρ ), is precisely S(U(B)), the set of separable elements in U(B). To this
end, note first that in both (2× L)ρ and ((2× L)ρ)κ , the join of atoms exists and
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can be easily described. Let a be the constantly 〈>2,⊥L〉 function in (2× L)ρ and
fa be the constantly a function in ((2×L)ρ)κ . Then clearly a is the join of atoms in
(2×L)ρ , and fa is the join of atoms in ((2×L)ρ)κ . Similarly, let l be the constantly
〈⊥2,>L〉 function in (2×L)ρ and fl be the constantly l function in ((2×L)ρ)κ . Then
l is the join of atomless elements in (2×L)ρ , and fl is the join of atomless elements
in ((2×L)ρ)κ .
Now, to show that S(U(B)) ⊆ lim−1(⊥(2×L)ρ ), it is enough to show that every
atomic and every atomless elements in U(B) are in lim−1(⊥(2×L)ρ ) since the S(U(B))
is the ideal generated by those elements and a kernel is always an ideal. Let f be
an atomic element in U(B). First, we claim that f ≤ fa. Suppose not. Then there
would be i < κ, j < ρ such that f (i)( j)∧>L is non-trivial. Let g be the function
in ((2× L)ρ)κ such that g(i′)( j′) = ⊥2×L unless i′ = i and j′ = j, in which case
g(i′)( j′) = f (i)( j)∧>L. Then g ≤ f , limg = ⊥(2×L)ρ , and hence g ∈ U(B). But
obviously g is atomless in U(B) since we can simply keep decreasing g(i)( j) using
the fact that L is atomless, and the resulting function’s limit is still ⊥(2×L)ρ , meaning
that the function itself is still in U(B). This contradicts that f is atomic. So f ≤ fa,
and hence lim f ≤ a. But recall that f is from U(B) and hence lim f ∈ e[B], which
means that for each i < ρ , (lim f )(i) ∈ {>2×L,⊥2×L}. Now for each i < ρ , a(i) <
>2×L. Obviously then, the only element in e[B] that is below a is ⊥(2×L)ρ , and hence
lim f =⊥(2×L)ρ . So we are done showing that every atomic element in U(B) is in the
kernel of lim. To show that every atomless element in U(B) is in the kernel of lim the
strategy is exactly the same. If f ∈U(B) is atomless, then we can show similarly that
f ≤ fl. Then lim f , being both below l and also inside e[B], must be ⊥(2×L)ρ . So this
f is also in the kernel of lim.
To show that lim−1(⊥(2×L)ρ ) ⊆ S(U(B)), pick an arbitrary f ∈ U(B) such that
lim f = ⊥(2×L)ρ . Then f ∧ fa is also in U(B) as lim( f ∧ fa) must also be ⊥(2×L)ρ .
For similar reasons, f ∧ fl ∈U(B) too. Now clearly f ∧ fa is atomic in U(B) since it
is the join of {gi, j | ( f ∧ fa)(i)( j) = 〈>2,⊥L〉} where gi, j is the function that always
returns ⊥2×L expect that gi, j(i)( j) = 〈>2,⊥L〉. Each gi, j is obviously in U(B) and is
atomic. Hence f ∧ fa is a join of atoms in U(B) and hence atomic. Similarly f ∧ fl
is atomless in U(B) as it is the join of the elements of the form hi, j below it where
hi, j always returns ⊥2×L except that hi, j(i)( j) = 〈⊥2,>L〉. Each hi, j is in U(B) and
is atomless. Hence f ∧ fl is atomless. But then, f is separable by definition since
f = ( f ∧ fa)∨ ( f ∧ fl). uunionsq
Now we can sum the above up and obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.9 For every Boolean algebra A, there is a (2ω0)+-field-of-sets B which
is elementarily equivalent to A.
Proof Let κ be (2ω0)+. It is a successor cardinal, so it is regular. By Proposition
4.7, it is enough to show that for every c ∈ Inv, there is a (2ω0)+-field-of-sets B such
that Inv(B) = c. Now Inv can be partitioned into three parts: {〈−1,0〉}, {〈m,n〉 | m ∈
N,n ∈ Z∞}, and {〈∞,0〉}. For 〈−1,0〉, we use℘(∅). For the second part, we use a
simple induction on the first coordinate.
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1. For non-zero n ∈ N, Inv(℘(n)) = 〈0,n〉, and Inv(℘(N)) = 〈0,∞〉. For 〈0,0〉, use
the L from Proposition 4.8, which is an atomless κ-field-of sets. For invariants
〈0,−n〉 (n > 0) and 〈0,−∞〉, use℘(n)×L and℘(N)×L, respectively.
2. Suppose for any n ∈ Z∞, there is a κ-field-of-sets Bn such that Inv(Bn) = 〈m,n〉.
Then for 〈m+1,n〉 for any n ∈ Z∞, use U(Bn), since by Lemma 4.15, U(Bn) is a
κ-field-of-sets, U(Bn)/S(U(Bn))∼= Bn, and thus Inv(U(Bn)) = Inv(Bn)+〈1,0〉=
〈m+1,n〉.
For the invariant 〈∞,0〉, take the product B = Πi∈NU i(2) = 2×U(2)×U(U(2))×
U(U(U(2))) · · · . That B is a κ-field-of-sets follows from Proposition 4.4. Also, since
B/S(B) = Πi∈NU i(2)/S(U i(2)) = 1×Πi∈N,i>0U i−1(2), B/S(B) is isomorphic to B.
(1 is the trivial algebra, and it appears here as the result of 2/S(2).) This means that
for any n ∈ N, B(n) is isomorphic to B, which means that Inv(B) = 〈∞,0〉. uunionsq
The only missing link now is the following proposition, shown in [51].
Proposition 4.10 (Vermeer 1996) Every (2ω0)+-field-of-sets is a quotient of a com-
plete Boolean algebra.
With this, we can prove the following lemma, which leads to a proof of Lemma 4.8
that also takes care of the requirements for the distinguished elements z and g.
Lemma 4.16 For every Boolean algebra A there is a non-trivial complete Boolean
algebra C with a filter H ⊆C such that∧H =⊥, and that A is elementarily equivalent
to C/H.
Proof If A is trivial, let D be the two-element Boolean algebra and H the improper
filter in D. Now pick an arbitrary non-trivial Boolean algebra A. By Proposition 4.9,
there is a (2ω0)+-field-of-sets B that is elementarily equivalent to A. Then we only
need to find a complete Boolean algebra C such that C◦ B.
Notice that (2ω0)+ is a successor cardinal, so it is regular. Then, by Proposition
4.6, there is a (2ω0)+-field-of-sets B′ such that B′ ◦ B. By Proposition 4.10, then,
there is a complete Boolean algebra C such that C B′. But then, by Proposition 4.5,
C◦ B. Since A is non-trivial, B and hence C must also be non-trivial. uunionsq
Proof (for Lemma 4.8)
Pick an arbitrary zg-algebra 〈A,z,g〉. We decompose A as A|z×A|zg×A|zg since
g ≤ z. Since we are only after elementary equivalence, by Proposition 4.7, it is
enough to find 〈A′,z′,g′〉 such that Inv(A′|z′) = Inv(A|z), Inv(A′|z′g′) = Inv(A|zg), and
Inv(A′|z′g′)= Inv(A|zg), and that 〈A′,z′,g′〉 is the natural quotient of a complete proper
filter algebra.
By the definition of zg-algebra, A|zg is atomic and A|zg is atomless. Let A′2 and
A′3 be the MacNeille completion of A|zg and A|zg, respectively. Note that MacNeille
completion does not change the number of atoms. Thus Inv(A′2) = Inv(A|zg), and
Inv(A′3) = Inv(A|zg).
To figure out A′|z, we invoke Lemma 4.16. By that lemma, there is a non-trivial
complete Boolean algebra C with a filter H, such that C/H is elementarily equivalent
to A|z, and that ∧H =⊥C. Let A′1 =C/H.
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Now let 〈A′,z′,g′〉= 〈A′1×A′2×A′3,〈⊥,>,>〉,〈⊥,⊥,>〉〉. Then by construction,
〈A′,z′,g′〉 is also a zg-algebra and is elementarily equivalent to 〈A,z,g〉.
Then let B = 〈B,F〉 where B =C×A′2×A′3 and F = H×{>}×{>}. For this
B, we need to establish two points.
– First,B is a complete proper filter algebra. To see this, note first that C×A′2×A′3
is a complete Boolean algebra as each of the three components are. Then note that
F is a proper filter. It is obviously a filter. It is proper because if not, A′1, A
′
2, and
A′3 are all trivial, and hence A
′ and A are trivial since A′ and A are elementarily
equivalent. But A is a zg-algebra and zg-algebras are non-trivial. Note though that
any two of A′1,A
′
2, and A
′
3 can be trivial together.
– Also, the natural quotient of B, B/F , is precisely 〈A′,z′,g′〉. That A′ = B/F is
a simple Boolean algebra exercise. The next thing to note is that zB =
∧
F =
〈⊥,>,>〉 ∈ B since ∧H = ⊥C. Hence piF(zB) = 〈⊥,>,>〉 ∈ A′, which is pre-
cisely z′. Also, the join of atoms below zB in B is precisely 〈⊥,>,⊥〉 as A′2 by
construction is atomic and A′3 is atomless.
The extra constraints in Lemma 4.8 are also obviously satisfied.B|zB ∼=C is always
non-trivial by construction. B|zBgB ∼= A′2 is trivial if and only if A|zg is trivial since
the construction method is MacNeille completion. By the same reason,B|zBgB ∼= A′3
is trivial if and only if A|zg is trivial. uunionsq
5 Stronger logics and decidability
In the previous section, our only goal was the completeness theorems Theorem 4.1
and Theorem 4.2. However, the method we used to show them in fact supports a
full analysis of the expressivity of LΠ on complete proper filter algebras and the
normal Π-extension of KD4∀5Π, similar to the one in [16]. In light of the space such a
general analysis would take, in this section we focus only on several natural concrete
cases in which we only add one formula, or equivalently finitely many formulas, to
KD4∀5Π. Since KD4∀5Πzg is a definitional extension of KD4∀5Π, in this section we
move between KD4∀5Π and KD4∀5Πzg freely in stating the results, noting that to
obtain the results inLΠ, one only needs to replace z and g by their definitions in the
axioms z and g in Definition 4.9.
Before we start, let us introduce a bit of notation. For any X ⊆LΠzg, letCPPA(Γ )
be the class of complete proper filter algebras validating every formula in Γ . As
usual we write CPPA(ϕ) for CPPA({ϕ}) and write CPPA for CPPA(∅), the class
of all complete proper filter algebras. Then for any class K of complete proper fil-
ter algebras, we write Log(K) for the set of formulas in LΠzg that are valid in all
complete proper filter algebras in K. Finally, as usual, for any ϕ ∈LΠzg, we write
KD4∀5Πzgϕ for the smallest normal Π-logic extending KD4∀5Πzg with ϕ . Then, we
first define the following semantics-preserving mapping between complete proper
filter algebras.
Definition 5.1 For any complete proper filter algebrasB andB′ and any function f
fromB toB′, we say f is a complete homomorphism if
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– f is a complete Boolean homomorphism: f (¬a) = ¬ f (a) and f (∧X) =∧ f [X ];
– for any a ∈B, a ∈ FB iff f (a) ∈ FB′ .
Proposition 5.1 If f :B→B′ is a complete homomorphism, then for any valuation
θ onB and ϕ ∈LΠzg, f (θ˜(ϕ)) = f˜ ◦θ(ϕ).
Proof If ϕ ∈LΠ, a simple induction suffices. For ϕ ∈LΠzg, note that we have the
definitional axioms z and g that are sound. uunionsq
Now we prove the following general but not fully general completeness theorem.
Theorem 5.1 For any ϕ ∈LΠzg, KD4∀5Πzgϕ = Log(CPPA(ϕ)).
Proof That KD4∀5Πzgϕ ⊆ Log(CPPA(ϕ)) is trivial by soundness. Now pick an ar-
bitrary ψ ∈ Log(CPPA(ϕ)). Without loss of generality we assume that both ϕ and ψ
are sentences. Since we will only be dealing with sentences whose semantic values
do not depend on particular valuations, we use the notation B(χ) for the semantic
value of χ in B. By necessitation and modus ponens in KD4∀5Πzg, it is enough to
show that ` (ϕ ∧Bϕ)→ ψ . By the completeness theorem, then, it is enough to show
that for everyB ∈ CPPA,B  (ϕ ∧Bϕ)→ ψ .
Pick an arbitrary complete proper filter algebra B. If B(ϕ) 6∈ FB , then we are
done since B(Bϕ) and hence B(ϕ ∧Bϕ) in this case is ⊥. So now we focus on
the case where B(ϕ) ∈ FB and let v = B(ϕ). Consider B′ defined by restricting
B to v: B′ = 〈B|v,{a∧ v | a ∈ FB}〉. It is not hard to see that h :B→B′ defined
by h(a) = a∧ v is a complete homomorphism. By Proposition 5.1, we see that (1)
B′(ϕ) = h(B(ϕ)) = v = >B′ and also that (2) B′(ψ) = h(B(ψ)). From (1), it
follows that B′  ϕ . By assumption, B′  ψ . Hence, by (2), h(B(ψ)) = v and thus
B(ψ)≥ v. This means thatB(ψ)≥B(ϕ ∧Bϕ) and thatB  (ϕ ∧Bϕ)→ ψ . uunionsq
While of course there is a limit to the expressivity ofLΠzg, many natural classes
of complete proper filter algebras corresponds to the validity of sentences inLΠzg.
We give some examples below.
Corollary 5.1 – CPPA(z) is the class of complete proper filter algebras with trivial
filters. Hence its logic is KD4∀5Πzgz. InLΠ, the logic is KD4∀5Π∀p(Bp→ p).
– CPPA(Bz) is the class of complete proper filter algebras with principal filters.
Hence its logic is KD4∀5ΠzgBz. InLΠ, the logic is KD4∀5ΠImmod.
– The class of complete proper filter algebras with ultrafilters is defined by ∀p(Bp∨
B¬p). Hence its logic inLΠ is KD4∀5Π∀p(Bp∨B¬p).
Now we consider an undefinable property: atomicity. To see that it is not definable
by the validity of any formula inLΠzg, we first establish a general proposition.
Proposition 5.2 For any complete proper filter algebras B and B′, if zB and z′B
are non-trivial and B/FB and B′/F ′B are elementarily equivalent, then Log(B) =
Log(B′).
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Proof Let B and B′ with the suppositions above be given. Observe first that when
passing from B to B/FB , the Boolean structure of B below zB and the Boolean
structure of B/FB below zB/FB are the same. In fact, if B is a complete Boolean
algebra, F a complete filter in B, and z the meet of F , then B/F is isomorphic to
(B|z/F |z)×B|z where F |z = {a∧¬z | a ∈ F}. Thus, the zg in B is trivial iff the zg
in B/FB is trivial, and the same goes for zg and for B′. Since B/FB and B′/F ′B
are elementarily equivalent, zg (resp. zg) in B is non-trivial iff zg (resp. zg) in B′
is non-trivial. Since we also assumed that the z in both B and B′ are non-trivial, in
sum, the triviality of z, zg, and zg inB andB′ are the same, respectively.
Now, recall that by Lemma 4.7, for any sentence ϕ ∈LΠzg, we can assume that
ϕ = (z∧ϕz)∨ (zg∧ϕzg)∨ (zg∧ϕzg) where ϕz, ϕzg, and ϕzg are all inLBΠzg. This
means, given Lemma 4.1 and that the natural quotients ofB andB′ are elementarily
equivalent, B  χ iff B′  χ for all χ ∈ {ϕz,ϕzg,ϕzg}. By the simple reasoning we
have used in the beginning of the proof of Theorem 4.2,B  ϕ iffB′  ϕ . To show
the same for formulas with free variables, take the universal closure of them. uunionsq
Proposition 5.3 There is no Γ ⊆LΠzg such that CPPA(Γ ) is precisely the class of
atomic complete proper filter algebras.
Proof LetB0 = 〈℘(N),F0〉 where F0 is a non-principal ultrafilter of℘(N). Then let
B1 = 〈L,F1〉where L is a complete atomless Boolean algebra and F1 is an ultrafilter in
L. Note that for both i ∈ {0,1}, zBi is ⊥ and the natural quotientBi/Fi is isomorphic
to 〈2,⊥,⊥〉 where 2 is a two-element Boolean algebra. By Proposition 5.2, for any
ϕ ∈LΠzg,B0  ϕ if and only ifB1  ϕ . ButB0 is atomic yetB1 is not. uunionsq
However, the undefinability of atomicity in complete proper filter algebras does not
preclude axiomatization. An obvious validity on atomic complete proper filter alge-
bras is z→ g since z must be below the join of atoms below z. Is this enough, and
can we just append this to KD4∀5Πzgϕ to obtain the logic of the atomic elements in
CPPA(ϕ)? In fact, we can. To show this, first note that we can strengthen Lemma
4.16 so that the non-trivial complete Boolean algebra C is also atomic. This can be
done simply by using the canonical extension Cδ , the powerset algebra of the set of
ultrafilters of C, rather than C as the final result of that lemma, since by Sikorski’s
extension lemma and C being complete, Cδ C (for a proof, see [28], Theorem 5,
Chapter 13). We can then chain the surjective morphisms and see that Cδ ◦ B where
B is elementarily equivalent to an arbitrarily given Boolean algebra. But then, the
Lemma 4.8 is also strengthened so that besides all other requirements, zB can be
atomic. In sum, the completeness theorem is now strengthened into the following: if
ϕ ∈LΠzg is valid on all complete proper filter algebras B such that zB is atomic,
then ϕ is already in KD4∀5Πzg. To formulate results below, let us use CPPAzat(Γ )
to denote the class of complete proper filter algebras such that z is atomic and every
formula in Γ is validated and use CPPAat(Γ ) for the class of complete proper filter
algebras that are atomic and validates everything in Γ .
we can then obtain a stronger general completeness theorem.
Theorem 5.2 For every formula ϕ ∈LΠzg, KD4∀5Πzgϕ = Log(CPPAzat(ϕ)). For
CPPAat, we have that KD4∀5Πzg((z→ g)∧ϕ) = Log(CPPAat(ϕ)).
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Proof To show that KD4∀5Πzgϕ = Log(CPPAzat(ϕ)), using Theorem 5.1, we only
need to show that Log(CPPAzat(ϕ))⊆ Log(CPPA(ϕ)). This clearly follows from the
fact that for everyB ∈ CPPA there is aB′ ∈ CPPAzat such that Log(B) = Log(B′).
If B is such that zB is trivial, then B itself is in CPPAzat and we are done. If zB is
not trivial, then apply the strengthend Lemma 4.8 to B/FB and obtain B′. By the
strengthining,B′ ∈CPPAzat. Moreoever, Lemma 4.8 states that the zg (resp. zg) inB′
is non-trivial iff the zg (resp. zg) inB/FB is non-trivial. This means that Proposition
5.2 can be applied toB andB′, and from it we have that Log(B) = Log(B′).
To show that KD4∀5Πzg((z→ g)∧ϕ)= Log(CPPAat(ϕ)), note thatCPPAzat(z→
g) =CPPAat and thus CPPAat(ϕ) =CPPAzat((z→ g)∧ϕ), since for anyB ∈CPPA,
zBgB is already atomic. uunionsq
With the above general completeness, we have the following corollary collecting
a few special cases. To state results in languageLΠ, let At stand for ∀p(Bp→ p)→
∃p(p∧ at(p)) where at(p) is defined as in Definition 4.4 except that all z used in
at(p) is replaced by ∀p(Bp→ p).
Corollary 5.2 – The logic of the class of atomic complete proper filter algebras
with trivial filters in languageLΠ is KD4∀5ΠAt∀p(Bp→ p).
– The logic of the class of atomic complete proper filter algebras with principal
filters in languageLΠ is KD4∀5ΠAtImmod.
– The logic of the class of atomic complete proper filter algebras with ultrafilters in
languageLΠ is KD4∀5ΠAt∀p(Bp∨B¬p).
Before we move on to decidability, note that since KD4∀5Π is sound on the class of all
complete KD45 algebras, the above general completeness theorems, when phrased in
LΠ (since we didn’t define the semantics of z and g on those algebras), hold for
complete KD45 algebras too.
For decidability, the situation is simple: all the logics mentioned above are decid-
able. To see this, we first state a general theorem linking the decidability of logics in
the form of Log(K) to the decidability of the first-order theories of some classes of
zg-algebras coming from K.
Theorem 5.3 For any K ⊆ CPPA, Let QK0 = {B/FB | B ∈ K and zB = ⊥} and
QK1 = {B/FB |B ∈ K and zB 6=⊥}. Then, if QK0 and QK1 have a decidable first-
order theory inFOL zg, then Log(K) is decidable.
Proof For any ϕ ∈LΠzg, to decide whether ϕ ∈ Log(K), we can first take its uni-
versal closure and then turn it into a sentence of the form
(z∧α)∨ (zg∧β )∨ (zg∧ γ)
with α,β ,γ ∈LBΠzg. Obviously this process is decidable. Then, following similar
reasoning done in the proof of Theorem 4.2, ϕ ∈ Log(K) if and only if for allB ∈K,
the following hold.
– Either zBgB =⊥ orB/FB T (β ).
– Either zBgB =⊥ orB/FB T (γ).
– Either zB =⊥ orB/FB T (α).
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It is not hard to see that zBgB =⊥ if and only ifB/FB  ((z∧g) =⊥), and similarly
zBgB =⊥ if and only ifB/FB  ((z∧¬g) =⊥). This is because zB =
∧
FB , so all
distinctions below zB are preserved under quotienting through FB . However, there is
no analog for zB . It may well be thatB/FB  ¬z=⊥ while zB >⊥. This happens
whenever FB is principal, and this is why we need to take care of two classes of
natural quotients. Using the observations we collected, now ϕ ∈ Log(K) if and only
if the following hold.
– For all B ∈ K such that zB = ⊥, B/FB  ((zg = ⊥)∨T (β ))∧ ((zg = ⊥)∨
T (γ)).
– For allB ∈ K such that zB 6=⊥,B/FB  T (α)∧ ((zg =⊥)∨T (β ))∧ ((zg =
⊥)∨T (γ)).
Thus we are now deciding if two formulas, obtained effectively from ϕ , are in the
first-order theories of QK0 and QK1 respectively. By assumption the two theories are
decidable. Hence whether ϕ ∈ Log(K) is decidable. uunionsq
Theorem 5.4 The following logics are decidable:
– KD4∀5Π,
– KD4∀5Π∀p(Bp→ p),
– KD4∀5ΠB∀p(Bp→ p),
– KD4∀5Π∀p(Bp∨B¬p),
– KD4∀5ΠAt,
– KD4∀5ΠAt∀p(Bp→ p),
– KD4∀5ΠAtB∀p(Bp→ p),
– KD4∀5ΠAt∀p(Bp∨B¬p).
Proof As is argued above, each of them comes from a well-behaved class of complete
proper filter algebras. Take KD4∀5Π for example. It is the logic of CPPA. Using the
notation above in Theorem 5.3, we only need to argue that QCPPA0 and QCPPA1
have decidable theories inFOL zg.
– QCPPA0 is just the class of complete zg-algebras with z being the top element.
This is because that if B = 〈B,F〉 is such that zB = ⊥, then zB = >, and hence
F is the trivial filter. Thus B/F = 〈B,>,g〉 where g is the join of atoms. It is
well known that the first-order theory of non-trivial complete Boolean algebras is
decidable. To decide whether ϕ ∈FOL zg is valid in QCPPA0, we only need to
test whether the formula (x = >∧ at(y))→ ϕ[x/z,y/g] in FOL is valid in all
non-trival complete Boolean algebras, where x and y are two fresh variables and
at(y) states that y is the join of all atoms (which is expressible inFOL ).
– By Lemma 4.8, we see that the theory of QCPPA1 is precisely the theory of all
zg-algebras: FOLzg. This theory is decidable since the theory of all non-trivial
Boolean algebras is well kown to be decidable, and to test whether ϕ ∈FOL zg
is in FOLzg, we only need to test whether the formula at(x,y)→ ϕ[x/z,y/g] is
valid in all non-trivial Boolean algebras, where x and y are fresh variables and
at(x,y) states that y is the join of the atoms below x.
The argument above clearly generalizes to all other cases, noting also that the first-
order theory of atomic Boolean algebras, the first-order theory of complete and atomic
Boolean algebras, and the first-order theory of two-element Boolean algebras are all
decidable. We briefly sketch theFOL zg theories we need for the other logics.
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– KD4∀5Π∀p(Bp→ p) is the logic of complete proper filter algebras with the trivial
filter. Calling this class K, the theory of QK0 is the theory of complete zg-algebras
with z being >, and the theory of QK1 is the inconsistent theory since QK1 is
empty.
– KD4∀5ΠB∀p(Bp→ p) is the logic of complete proper filter algebras with a prin-
cipal filter. Calling this class K, the theory of QK0 is the theory of complete zg-
algebras with z being >, and the theory of QK1 is also the theory of complete
zg-algebras with z being >.
– KD4∀5ΠB∀p(Bp∨B¬p) is the logic of complete proper filter algebras with an
ultrafilter. Calling this class K, the theory of QK0 is the theory of two-element
zg-algebras with z being >, and the theory of QK1 is the theory of two-element
zg-algebras.
– For KD4∀5ΠAt, the relevantFOL zg-theories are the theory of atomic and com-
plete zg-algebras with z being> and the theory of zg-algebras with g being equal
to z.
– For KD4∀5ΠAt∀p(Bp→ p), the relevantFOL zg-theories are the theory of atomic
and complete zg-algebras and the inconsistent theory.
– For KD4∀5ΠAtB∀p(Bp → p), the relevant FOL zg-theories is the theory of
atomic and complete zg-algebras with z being >.
– For KD4∀5ΠAt∀p(Bp∨B¬p), the relevant FOL zg-theories are the theory of
two-element zg-algebras with z being> and the theory of two-element zg-algebras.
uunionsq
6 Conclusion
In the previous sections, we have studied complete KD45 algebras, complete proper
filter algebras, and logics inLΠ extending KD45 based on these algebras. It turns out
that KD4∀5Π is the weakest logic we can have if we use algebraic semantics based on
complete Boolean algebras of propositions to extend KD45 with propositional quan-
tifiers. Beyond KD4∀5Π, the semantics based on complete proper filter algebras is
adequate for many logics, and we can even show some general completeness theo-
rems. Moreover, the semantics is arguably intuitive for the language LΠ as many
properties of the algebras can be easily defined by the language, with atomicity being
an exception, and we can determine decidability easily in many cases if the logic is
coming from a class of complete proper filter algebras.
To conclude, we mention some directions of future research. First, noting that the
set of measure 1 set in any probability space is always a proper filter in the algebra of
events and that probability spaces are commonly used to model subjective credences,
we may consider interpreting LΠ on probability spaces and obtain a logic of “cre-
dence 1”. The first difficulty for this is that in a probability space 〈X ,B,µ〉 with B the
algebra of events, in most realistc cases, B is not lattice complete. To overcome this,
it would be good to pin down exactly what is required for the well-definedness of
the semantics ofLΠ and see how widely applicable the requirement is. Once this is
done, to obtain the logic, our strategy above suggests that we need to study the natural
quotient of 〈B,F〉 by F , the filter of measure 1 sets. It is well known that if B is a σ -
On the Logic of Belief and Propositional Quantification 51
algebra and µ is countably additive, then B/F is lattice complete. Roughly speaking,
then, the first-order theory of the natural quotients of countably additive probability
spaces by their filter of measure 1 sets is at least the first-order theory of complete
Boolean algebras. On the other hand, if we do not assume countable additivity, then
there seems to be little constraint on what the quotient could be. These two obser-
vations suggest that LΠ is able to distinguish countably additive probability spaces
from merely finitely additive probability spaces.
Second, we can include more modal operators in the language, each of which is
interpreted by a proper filter. This is of course not the most general way to extend our
language with multiple modalities. But if not careful, we may suddenly find ourselves
on the other side of the axiomatizability boundary. Also, some special cases of this
semantics may be of conceptual significance. For example, there can be two modal
operators, one for “necessarily”, which is interpreted using the trivial filter containing
only the top element, and the other for “actually”, interpreted by a complete ultrafil-
ter, which is necessarily generated by an atom, or just a ultrafilter, if one would like
to drop the assumption that there is an “actual world”. Without the modality for ne-
cessity, the logic would be extending KD4∀5Π with both Immod and ∀p(Bp∨¬Bp)
or just ∀p(Bp∨¬Bp), depending one whether the ultrafilter is principal or not, as we
have shown above. Another example is when the modal operators are belief operators
of different agents, where the beliefs of all agents are publicly known to all agents, so
that one agent believes that p if and only if any other agent believes that the former
agent believes that p. We conjecture that the general idea of relativization to z, zg, and
zg on both the logic and the algebra sides can be generalized to deal with multiple
filters too.
Third, recall that algebraic semantics based on complete algebras cannot distin-
guish KD4∀5Π from KD45Π. In Section 2, we introduced semantics forLΠ based on
frames with propositional contingency. While it is true that to separate logics above
KD45 using this semantics, we need drop the usual first-order correspondences of
KD45 such as shift-reflexivity, this is not an insurmountable difficulty. We believe that
to show that 4∀ is not in KD45, the easiest way is to use semantics with propositional
contingency. It is also hopeful that we can have a semantics based on propositional
contingency that is adequate for KD45Π.
Let us now consider the general method of extending normal modal logics with
propositional quantifiers through complete algebras and raise some natural questions
here. Let L be the quantifier free fragment LΠ, and let CAlg(Γ ) be the class of
lattice complete BAOs validating all formulas in Γ , with CAlg(ϕ) and CAlg abbrevi-
ating CAlg({ϕ}) and CAlg(∅), respectively. Then, let Log(K) be the set of sentences
in LΠ validated by every member of K. Once these two operators are defined, a
series of standard questions can be asked. Most notably is the question of charac-
terizing the fixed points of this Galois connection, namely the classes of algebras of
the form CAlg(Γ ) and the sets of sentences of the form Log(K). But from the per-
spective of extending normal modal logics with propositional quantifiers, the natural
object of study is Log ◦CAlg, an operator from ℘(L ) to ℘(LΠ). A theorem we
have shown in this paper is that Log(CAlg(KD45)) = KD4∀5Π, where we see that ax-
iom 4 is strengthened into 4∀. Note, however, that Log(CAlg(S5)) = S5Π, in which
case there is no strengthening of the axioms in S5. In other words, for S5, the syn-
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tactic way of extending it with propositional quantifiers by adding Π-principles and
the semantic way of extending it by going through complete BAOs result in the same
logic, while for KD45 this is not so. In general, let us call a normal modal logic L in
L CΠ-complete if Log(CAlg(L)) = LΠ; that is, the syntactic way and the semantic
way of extending L to a Π-logic in LΠ are the same judging from the final result.
Then, we can ask what accounts for the distinction that KD45 is CΠ-incomplete yet
S5 is CΠ-complete, and more generally we can ask whether there is a more logical
or intrinsic way to characterize CΠ-(in)completeness.
The name “CΠ-completeness” we chose for the property is inspired by the well-
studied property of C -completeness of normal modal logics in L . Recall that by
definition, using our notation, a normal modal logic L ⊆ L is C -complete if and
only if Log(CAlg(L))∩L = L. Given that the definitions of these two properties
are similar in form, one might hope that there are some logical relations between
them. However, C -completeness does not imply CΠ-completeness since KD45 is
well known to be C -complete (in fact Kripke complete or more algebraically CAV -
complete), but we have just shown that it is CΠ-incomplete. The other direction is
also not obvious. Suppose L is C -incomplete. Then there is a ϕ ∈ (Log(CAlg(L))∩
L )\L. If we can show that ϕ 6∈ LΠ then we will be done. However, this is not obvious
as while ϕ ∈L , it may well be that LΠ is not conservative over L and LΠ∩L ) L
with ϕ witnessing the inequality. In general, we can call a normal modal logic L in
L Π-conservative if LΠ∩L = L. Then, it is easy to observe that C -incompleteness
plus Π-conservativity imply CΠ-incompleteness. However, it seems unlikely that C -
incompleteness and Π-conservativity can coexist, since the Π-principles intuitively
should help derive validities in complete BAOs that normal modal logics cannot. At
any rate, the logical relations among the above three properties about normal modal
logics regarding how they can be extended (with or without propositional quantifiers)
using complete BAOs seem intricate and may be worthy of future research.
Finally, we would like to point out that our proof of the completeness theorem
relies heavily on a syntactic reduction that can hardly be generalized below KD45
since once we introduced z and g, by the end of the process, we see that all quantifiers
are outside the scope of the modal operators, and moreover there is only one layer of
modal operators. Once we let go of the 4 and 5 axioms, we can hardly achieve this
result. Our strategy may still work when we study Log(CAlg(K45)), but a method
more generalizable is clearly needed if we want to venture further.
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